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As highlighted in the 9/11 Commission Report, the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) and Fire Department City of New York (FDNY) have suffered from a lack of 
inter-agency communication for many years, which is of particular detriment to the safety 
of front-line members of the FDNY. This thesis sought to find new solutions to the 
problem by analyzing the processes and policies driving communications to and within 
the FDNY and the degree to which they have changed since McKinsey & Company’s 
analysis of the department in 2002. A study of organizational change theories, including 
Leavitt’s Diamond, was used to analyze organizational change issues within the FDNY. 
Synthesizing these theories with the department’s successful and failed change attempts 
produced a set of tasks to create and implement a new technology in the form of a mobile 
application called FDNY Mobile. This thesis concluded that improving information 
sharing between the FDNY and the NYPD is nearly impossible without first analyzing 
the information-sharing practices of an individual organization. Information sharing 
between these organizations must be reciprocal. This thesis found that without creating a 
sense of urgency and managerial support, FDNY Mobile will end in failure. Moreover, 
the FDNY needs to strengthen its own information-sharing practices before a more 
detailed focus is made on inter-agency information sharing with the NYPD. 
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Threat and safety information is not making it to front-line members of the Fire 
Department of the City of New York (FDNY). The FDNY’s information-sharing 
processes need improvement in order to enhance the safety of all FDNY personnel. In 
response to 9/11, many scholars have researched inter-agency communication between 
the FDNY and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Unfortunately, 
information-sharing practices between these agencies have not changed much despite 
ongoing scholarly research. Instead of trying to reinvent another solution to improve 
inter-agency communication, this thesis focused on the organizational information-
sharing practices of the FDNY. Building an improved information-sharing network 
within the FDNY can create opportunity to enhance inter-agency information sharing. 
Metadata from DiamondPlate, the FDNY’s information-sharing platform, highlights thin 
readership and a need for improvement. An FDNY survey of 500 firefighters and EMS 
personnel was conducted from 2014 to 2015, the results of which suggested that only half 
of the members surveyed actually use DiamondPlate. Poor DiamondPlate access and 
limited usage creates a potential information-sharing gap within the FDNY. 
A. METHODS 
This research looked internally at the FDNY using a prescriptive paradigm to 
offer some information-sharing solutions. An analysis of DiamondPlate metadata 
provided by the platform’s management team was conducted. In addition, the responses 
to the FDNY survey were analyzed. A study of organizational change theories, including 
Leavitt’s Diamond, were used to analyze barriers to organizational change within the 
FDNY. Harold Leavitt’s work views organizations as complex systems consisting of the 
following interacting variables: tasks, structure, technology, and people.1 Leavitt posits, 
“These four are highly interdependent … so that a change in any one usually results in a 
                                                 
1 Harold J. Leavitt, “Applied Organizational Change in Industry: Structural, Technological and 
Humanistic Approaches,” in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March, 1144–1170 (Skokie, IL: 
Rand McNally, 1965), 1144. 
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compensatory (or retaliatory) change in the others.”2 Joseph Mosca and Stuart Rosenberg 
describe twenty factors that lead to organizational change resistance.3 Ann Gilley, Jerry 
W. Gilley, and Marisha Godek support the idea of implementing change gradually. These 
authors suggest that people perceive gradual change as more manageable and adjust 
much better to changes that occur slowly.4 Synthesizing these theories with successful 
and failed change attempts made by the department, analyzing deficiencies in 
DiamondPlate, and studying new technologies produced a set of tasks to create and 
implement a new technology in the form of an app called FDNY Mobile.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The FDNY needs to strengthen its own information-sharing practices before a 
more detailed focus is made on inter-agency information sharing with the NYPD. There 
are a few reasons for DiamondPlate’s low usage rate. First, members do not have access 
to this platform while off duty. Firefighter access is limited to the time on duty and when 
physically inside the firehouse. Another reason is, even if time permits, there is only one 
computer kiosk in each firehouse. This lone workstation is insufficient for 
accommodating four to ten firefighters working a given shift. Analyzing DiamondPlate 
metrics revealed that essential information is not reaching field personnel in a timely 
manner. Moreover, DiamondPlate is only used to push information. The department 
could benefit by using the virtual platform to pull operational intelligence and safety 
information from personnel in a timely fashion. Changing how the FDNY disseminates 
threat and safety information with members is not an easy task. 
Studying examples of both failed and successful FDNY changes, along with the 
organizational change theories, helped define some of the barriers that have restrained the 
FDNY. Without the right execution, any attempt to change a procedure within the FDNY 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Joseph Mosca and Stuart Rosenberg, “Breaking Down the Barriers to Organizational Change,” 
International Journal of Management and Information Systems 15, no. 3 (2011): 141, doi: 
10.19030/ijmis.v15i3.4650. 
4 Ann Gilley, Jerry W. Gilley, and Marisha Godek, “Change, Resistance, and the Organizational 
Immune System,” SAM Advanced Management Journal 74 (September 2009): 7. 
 xv 
is set up for failure. The vast majority of change in the FDNY occurs in a reactive rather 
than a proactive fashion. Initiatives that have failed to change the department in some 
way include the 2007 FDNY intelligence strategy, the development of an FDNY 
suspicious activity report program, and the implementation of an emergency action 
message. 
Analyzing the positive FDNY change examples could provide future endeavors a 
blueprint for successful implementation. Three successful FDNY change initiatives were 
analyzed in this thesis. The first included the way information is shared with members 
through DiamondPlate technology. The second successful example analyzed the creation 
of an FDNY Rescue Task Force. The third studied how the department added new safety 
equipment, such as bunker gear, and the personal safety system. DiamondPlate proved 
the department can implement successful changes in a proactive manner. However, the 
information-sharing platform does have its shortcomings. Without managerial support, 
most change initiatives within the FDNY will fail.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Developing an FDNY mobile app could enhance the safety of all department 
personnel. As DiamondPlate and survey data suggest, many members in the FDNY 
remain uninformed and this lack of awareness creates an unsafe condition during 
responses while potentially inhibiting information sharing among members. Developing 
an FDNY app helps solve the problem of reaching off-duty members as opposed to only 
those physically working at a firehouse or EMS station. This thesis presents eight 
recommendations to guide the FDNY through organizational change barriers to 
successfully implement FDNY Mobile. The FDNY must adopt a new information-
sharing strategy. It is critical to create a sense of urgency in order to drive managerial 
support for FDNY Mobile. 
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On September 27, 2016, Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) 
firefighters responded to a natural gas emergency, one of thousands the department 
mitigates each year. When firefighters gained access to the residence, they uncovered 
what looked like a homemade drug laboratory. The room was dark and appeared to be 
filled with drug paraphernalia. The firefighters immediately retraced their steps, 
evacuated the occupancy, and called for backup.1 Fire personnel evacuated the multi-
family home, ensured the street was blocked off from public traffic, and awaited Con 
Edison, the gas utility, in the street.  
Meanwhile, Battalion Chief Michael J. Fahy stood in the street managing the 
scene from a location every incident commander stages, seemingly out of harm’s way. 
Suddenly, suspect Julio Saucedo tried to flee the scene. Fearing Saucedo’s car would 
ignite an explosion, Chief Fahy confronted the suspect in front of the building.2 It was 
during this interaction that, without warning, the house exploded. A large section of roof 
blew off the top of the home and landed on top of the chief. In addition to Chief Fahy, six 
police officers and nine firefighters were injured at the scene.3 Unfortunately, after being 
rushed to the hospital in a police car, Chief Fahy—loving husband and father of three 
young children—passed away. 
Had the responding companies known from the beginning that the residence was 
used as a drug lab, fire department operations would not have committed such a large 
number of resources to the occupancy or staged the incident command post so close to 
the scene. In the aftermath of the tragedy, it would be revealed that law enforcement had 
received an anonymous tip about the potential drug lab a few weeks before the explosion. 
                                                 
1 Jennifer Bain et al., “FDNY Battalion Chief Killed When Marijuana Grow House Explodes,” New 
York Post, September 27, 2016, http://nypost.com/2016/09/27/firefighters-respond-to-reported-house-
explosion-in-the-bronx/. 
2 Leonard Green and Ross Keith, “FDNY Chief Michael Fahy Encountered Bronx Drug House 
Suspect before Fatal Explosion,” New York Daily News, October 1, 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
new-york/bronx/fdny-chief-confronted-bronx-drug-house-suspect-fatal-blast-article-1.2813680. 
3 Bain et al., “FDNY Battalion Chief Killed.” 
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Nevertheless, intelligence of this kind—no matter its source—rarely gets to front-line 
members of the FDNY. Finding a way to share this type of intelligence may have 
prevented fifteen police officers and firefighters from getting injured and perhaps could 
have saved the life of Chief Fahy.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In 2015, the FDNY set a new record after responding to 1.7 million emergencies.4 
Some were very similar to the incident that killed Chief Fahy. Within this heightened 
level of activity, which is forecast to intensify in future years, the FDNY has a significant 
deficiency in its intelligence operations: there are no formal programs or procedures in 
place that organize department efforts for gathering or collecting information into 
processed, analyzed, and finished intelligence products. In addition, there is no 
established framework in which this intelligence is shared with any of the three FDNY 
branches, members of law enforcement (LE), or the intelligence community (IC).  
From an operational perspective, the fire department and the IC are not taking full 
advantage of unobstructed access available to front-line units of the FDNY. Personnel 
from all three branches of the FDNY (fire, fire prevention, and emergency medical 
services [EMS]) have uncovered suspected terrorist activity during routine building 
inspections, the investigation of complaints, and daily emergency responses. The 
suspicious activities or behaviors that these members discover lead to vast amounts of 
raw information that makes its way to the FDNY’s Terrorism Awareness Unit. However, 
there is no framework through which this information is processed, exploited, analyzed, 
and shared.  
The FDNY’s current internal doctrine stresses the importance of passing 
information up the chain of command when appropriate.5 This vertical dissemination can 
be viewed with some negativity because this method tends to silo the information among 
                                                 
4 Jennifer Fermino, “FDNY Responded to Record Number of Fire Calls in 2015, but Deaths Were 
Down,” New York Daily News, January 8, 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/fdny-responded-
fires-2015-deaths-article-1.2490523. 
5 Current FDNY Regulations and Emergency Response Plan bulletins only discuss sharing suspicious 
activity vertically up the chain of command and with internal fire marshals. There are no policies written to 
share with law enforcement or other members of the intelligence community. 
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administration and headquarter elements of the FDNY. An alternative to be examined is 
horizontal dissemination, i.e., sharing information across the community, which can 
ensure that key intelligence is operationalized and front-line members are informed and 
aware, giving them the best chance to remain abreast of terror and criminal activity, 
contribute to city counterterrorism efforts, and return home safely. Due to a lack of 
emphasis and little coordinated processes or operating frameworks, the horizontal 
dissemination of information continues to be a slow and cumbersome process for the 
FDNY.  
Concomitantly, and attributed to lapses in intelligence dissemination in and to the 
FDNY, there is a receptivity and consumption problem in which intelligence is not fully 
interpreted or effectively used at the front lines. Despite efforts to share information 
among personnel in the field, a lack of real-time situational awareness continues to exist. 
This problem has negatively impacted all members of the FDNY because important 
intelligence, brought to light by active and deployed firefighters in the workforce, is not 
making it to the front lines of the operating firefighting environment. Possible causes for 
this problem are an outdated FDNY dissemination framework and little to no use of 
established technologies, including FDNY’s department-wide DiamondPlate 
information-sharing platform, which is networked and available to all members. Included 
in this thesis is a study grounded in research that investigates and describes an alternative 
framework using Leavitt’s Diamond and tailored technological solutions that can 
incorporate the FDNY’s DiamondPlate program. By doing this, an effective FDNY 
intelligence-dissemination model is established and achieves full utilization of collected, 
analyzed, and reported intelligence that is actionable and current. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In an effort to improve the dynamics of information sharing by the FDNY, this 
thesis attempts to answer the following key question: 
How can the FDNY better inform its members about threat and safety 
information to improve situational awareness? 
 4 
This research question looks internally at one department using a prescriptive paradigm 
to offer some solutions. In the process of answering this primary inquiry, the thesis also 
explores the following sub-questions: 
1. How does the FDNY share and receive information? 
2. How are members from both fire and EMS currently informed of 
suspicious activity? 
3. What mobile technologies are available to improve current intelligence 
practices? 
4. What are the organizational change barriers when implementing new 
technology within the FDNY, and what can be done to mitigate them?  
5. How can mobile technology better connect the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) and the FDNY? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Welcoming the fire service into the intelligence community is not a new idea. In 
fact, there are many policies and experts opining as to how best to incorporate these two 
entities together. Included in this review are several post-9/11 government documents 
that indicate the importance of intelligence sharing, government support for fire service 
intelligence, current fire service intelligence initiatives, and several theses focused on 
these subjects.  
1. Information Sharing 
Long before the infamous 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, President 
Ronald Reagan issued an executive order regarding U.S. intelligence activities. The 
executive order reads, “State, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in 
securing and defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United 
States and its interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into account the 
responsibilities and requirements of State, local, and tribal governments … when 
undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect 
 5 
the United States.”6 Literature published decades later continues to call for many of the 
same initiatives.  
Shortly after the attacks of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
was tasked, along with other agencies, to work on strengthening information sharing. 
According to DHS, “Remedying information sharing shortfalls was a principal 
recommendation of the 9/11 commission. … In the ten years since 9/11, the federal 
government has strengthened the connection between collection and analysis on 
transnational organizations and threats. Terrorism-related information sharing across the 
intelligence community has greatly improved.”7 More specifically, the organization 
posits that there has been great success in sharing intelligence on threats, which is useful 
for state and local law enforcement as well as homeland security personnel.8 These 
claims fall in line with some of the goals set forth in the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing. In 2007, President George W. Bush recognized that local agencies 
play a significant role in daily counterterrorism activities. According to the White House, 
local agencies “require access to timely, credible, and actionable information and 
intelligence about individuals and groups intending to carry out attacks in the United 
States.”9 Additional literature was published to discuss the importance of information 
sharing between all levels of government. 
President Barack Obama reiterated this idea in 2012 with his National Strategy 
for Information Sharing and Safeguarding. President Obama states, “Our national 
security depends upon an ability to make information easily accessible to Federal, state, 
local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and foreign partners in a trusted manner, given the 
                                                 
6 “Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities,” Federation of American Scientists, 
accessed July 24, 2016, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf. 
7 “Information Sharing,” Department of Homeland Security (DHS), August 26, 2015, 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/information-sharing. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The White House, National Strategy for Information Sharing (Washington, DC: The White House, 
2007), https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/nsis_book_0.pdf. 
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appropriate mission context.”10 Within this strategy, President Obama discusses the 
operating environment, including threats to national security and information-sharing 
weaknesses. In addition, the President presents goals that include improving 
collaboration, increasing common processes, improving information discovery, and 
providing access through common standards.11 Larry Thompson, former United States 
Deputy Attorney General, takes it a step further and analyzes the lack of information 
sharing in a more critical way. These claims support the 9/11 Commission Report 
findings that a lack of information sharing was a contributing factor in the failure to 
prevent the 9/11 attacks.12 
2. Intelligence Cycle 
While the focus of this thesis is on improvement of intelligence dissemination, the 
intelligence cycle plays a crucial role in the process. There is a vast amount of literature 
that discusses the intelligence cycle. The literature on the subject varies slightly from one 
organization to the next. Several past theses on the subject of fire service intelligence 
have analyzed the intelligence cycle in great detail. Many homeland security 
organizations provide their own model of the intelligence cycle. The U.S. Army’s open-
source intelligence model describes an intelligence process that consists of four steps—
planning, preparing, collecting, and producing—and four continuing activities—
analyzing, generating intelligence knowledge, assessing, and disseminating.13  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) intelligence cycle, on the other hand, 
consists of six steps:  
                                                 
10 Barack Obama, National Strategy For Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2012, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy 
_1.pdf. 
11 Ibid. 
12 “The 9/11 Commission Report,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/; Larry D. Thompson, “Intelligence 
Collection and Information Sharing within the United States,” Brookings, December 8, 2003, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2003/12/08terrorism-thompson. 
13 Department of the Army, Open-Source Intelligence (ATP 2-22.9) (Washington, DC: Department of 
the Army, 2012), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/atp2-22-9.pdf. 
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Requirements are identified information needs—what we must know to 
safeguard the nation. … Planning and direction involve management of 
the entire effort, from identifying the need for information to delivering an 
intelligence product to a consumer. … Collection consists of gathering of 
raw information based on requirements. … Processing and Exploitation 
involves converting the vast amount of information collected into a form 
usable by analysts. … Analysis and Production describe the conversion 
of raw information into intelligence. … Dissemination—the last step—
includes distributing raw or finished intelligence to the consumers whose 
needs initiated the intelligence requirements. Movement through each step 
is fluid and requires active collaboration.14  
Other literature on intelligence shows a more complex process. Mark Lowenthal 
criticizes the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and other foreign intelligence 
models in his book, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Lowenthal describes the CIA’s 
circular representation of the process as an overly simple process that omits feedback.15 
He proposes a multi-layered seven-step intelligence process that includes feedback as a 
step. Lowenthal integrates feedback between the other six steps throughout the process.16 
He believes that this model “gives a much better sense of how the intelligence process 
operates on reality, being linear, circular, and open-ended all at the same time.”17 This 
model counters other literature on the intelligence cycle as it provides the flexibility to 
change various parts of the process as necessary.  
3. Fire Service Intelligence 
The creation of the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) in 2007 initiated a 
flurry of interest about the role of the fire service in terrorism-related information sharing. 
Over the course of the next several years, leaders in the fire service exchanged ideas to 
better include the fire service in the IC. Many of these ideas originated from theses that 
discuss the benefits and goals of the FSIE. According to Thomas Richardson, then 
battalion chief of the FDNY, “The FSIE was established by DHS because both the IC and 
                                                 
14 “Directorate of Intelligence,” Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), accessed July 22, 2016, 
https://www2.fbi.gov/intelligence/di_cycle.htm. 
15 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2015), 83. 
16 Ibid., 85. 
17 Ibid., 84. 
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the fire service recognized that firefighters played an important role in the intelligence 
process.”18 It was argued by some that the FSIE still needed improvement, however. The 
need for FSIE improvement became evident shortly after the United States Fire 
Administration began overseeing the initiative.19 In another thesis, graduate student 
Thomas Robson, an FDNY battalion chief, argued that while “the FSIE was a step in the 
right direction … this system still did not address the needs of the fire department in its 
local community.”20 Graduate student Joshua M. Dennis, a Chicago district chief, 
presented another weakness within the FSIE in 2012. He stated, “Smaller fire 
departments and fire departments without the resources to dedicate personnel and 
resources to either an internal intelligence unit or a law enforcement fusion center have 
no formal mechanism to receive intelligence or provide information to intelligence 
assets.”21  
Many of these theses have shown the advantages of the FSIE. This includes 
improved information sharing between homeland security partners and the fire service as 
well as instructions on how to incorporate intelligence education into firefighter and EMS 
personnel training. While there continues to be literature published discussing the 
importance of information sharing, there are no current documents discussing the FSIE. 
After DHS Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) left the initiative, the FSIE dissolved. 
In 2010, DHS and the Department of Justice issued an appendix called Fire 
Service Integration for Fusion Centers to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major 
Urban Area Fusion Centers publication. These guidelines are a part of the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative. This document 
provided a framework for integrating state and major urban area fusion centers and the 
fire service into the fusion process. DHS states, “Though once thought of as relating only 
                                                 
18 Thomas J. Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First 
Responders in the Fire and EMS Services,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 2. 
19 Ibid., 46. 
20 Thomas A. Robson, “A Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire 
Service,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 14. 
21 Joshua M. Dennis, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Where Do We Go from Here to Bring the 
Fire Service into the Domestic Intelligence Community?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012), 2. 
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to prevention, protection, and investigation missions, information and intelligence are 
now also recognized as important elements for execution of response and recovery 
missions.”22 This document analyzes how to best incorporate the fire service into current 
fusion center analysis as well as the different information-sharing processes. Much of the 
literature and discussion on fire service information sharing has waned in recent years. 
However, there is some literature that continues to push for intelligence inclusion and 
education for the fire service. 
In November of 2014, the United States Fire Administration issued a report, Fire 
Service Information Sharing, to inoculate members of the fire service into the intelligence 
community and culture. The Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT) released 
the 3rd edition of the Intelligence Guide for First Responders in 2015. JCAT has 
continued the work that the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group 
started with the first edition of this document in 2009. These documents have provided a 
baseline for understanding intelligence definitions, roles, and processes among the first 
responder community, as well as the importance of first responders in the IC. JCAT 
states, “Law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services personnel play a 
vital role in detecting and preventing attacks because of the nature of their work, their 
frequent interaction with members of the public, and the level of access their jobs 
provide.”23 This document reiterates language found in Executive Order 12333, United 
States Intelligence Activities, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. All first 
responders are recognized as playing a role in homeland security. 
4. Leavitt’s Diamond  
There are several theories that describe approaches to organizational change. 
Changing the way the FDNY collects, disseminates, and receives information to and from 
its members, as well as other homeland security partners, is not an easy task. The sheer 
                                                 
22 Global Justice Information Sharing Imitative, Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers 
(Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2010), https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/Fire%20service%20 
integration%20for%20Fusion%20Centers.pdf. 
23 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT), JCAT Intelligence Guide for First Responders 
(Washington, DC: National Counterterrorism Center, 2015), https://www.nctc.gov/jcat/docs/ 
Intelligence_Guide_for_First_Responders.pdf. 
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size of the department makes the notion appear daunting. Among the literature 
researched, work by Harold J. Leavitt is the most promising to help the FDNY build a 
better intelligence collection and dissemination framework.  
Leavitt’s Diamond describes four subjects as a framework for managing change 
within an organization: tasks, people, technology, and structure. Robert C. King III, 
graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, used this model in his thesis to determine 
how to best implement data-driven decision-making strategies for DHS. In The 
Department of Homeland Security’s Pursuit of Data-Driven Decision Making, King 
applies research data into three of the four diamond dimensions and categorizes themes 
as factors that will either impede or facilitate the goals of achieving data-driven decision 
making.24  
Research done by Chapple and Sayles has demonstrated some structural 
approaches that focus more on people than tasks. They posit that an organization changes 
structure to change people to improve task performance.25 For example, if the FDNY 
were to change its system for disseminating information, the situational awareness of 
firefighters and EMS personnel would improve.  
5. Conclusion 
This literature highlights several gaps that continue to exist in today’s fire service 
and the IC. None of the information-sharing and intelligence cycle literature discusses the 
fire service in any way. However, many of the policies and initiatives presented show 
relevance to the fire service, particularly the FDNY. Further analysis could enhance 
information dissemination practices within the FDNY.  
While aspects of the FSIE literature presented here changed the FDNY for the 
better, the department still has work to do to improve information-sharing practices. This 
work is clearly presented in the McKinsey & Company report, Increasing FDNY’s 
                                                 
24 Robert C. King III, “The Department of Homeland Security’s Pursuit of Data-Driven Decision 
Making,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 129–133. 
25 E.D. Chapple and L.R. Sayles, The Measure of Management (New York: Macmillan, 1961). 
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Preparedness.26 The FDNY is a local organization whose potential contributions to the 
IC and LE are under utilized and squandered. While some of the literature discusses the 
IC working from the bottom up, it rarely gets to the root of an organization. For example, 
Dennis’s thesis “examined options at a 10,000 foot level for organizational sharing.”27 
This also holds true for much of the government literature published on the subject of 
information sharing and fire service intelligence. Addressing these gaps in the literature 
at the individual organization level could yield a model for other departments to utilize. 
This could enhance communication with front-line members as well as improve 
information sharing with homeland security partners. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
(1) Object 
The unit of study for this research is the intelligence practices of the FDNY. This 
includes all fire and EMS personnel as well as fire investigation personnel. FDNY data 
show that an analysis of the current state of FDNY intelligence practices is necessary. 
The goal of this thesis is to propose possible solutions to improve dissemination within 
and by the FDNY. This includes analyzing the current framework that exists to exploit 
areas that need improvement. Comparative analyses of different technologies and mobile 
apps are a part of this research. Building a new information-sharing framework for the 
FDNY is also a part of this research. 
(2) Selection 
The FDNY continues to be the premier fire department in the United States.28 
The department recognizes its role as a leader in the fire service. As such, with the 
development of the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP), the FDNY 
continues to push the fire service into new areas of homeland security. Describing 
                                                 
26 McKinsey & Company, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness (New York: FDNY, 2002), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/fdny/downloads/pdf/about/mckinsey_report.pdf.  
27 Dennis, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants,” 49. 
28 “Firefighting in the U.S.: 100 Noteworthy Fire Departments,” Online Fire Science Degree, accessed 
July 16, 2016, http://onlinefiresciencedegree.org/noteworthy-fire-departments/. 
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alternatives to better enhance information sharing and intelligence within the FDNY 
could positively influence other departments to take on the challenge as well. 
(3) Limits 
Research for this project is strictly limited to improving current FDNY 
information-sharing practices. The study of how to apply this research to routine FDNY 
communications is outside the boundaries of this project. Research on how to impact 
routine communications with firefighters and EMS personnel is worth future 
consideration for those who choose to build on this research. 
(4) Data Sources 
Evidence for this project comes from literature that discusses information sharing, 
the intelligence cycle, the FSIE, FDNY doctrine, and the effects of utilizing mobile 
technology. Hard data highlighting the usage of the current FDNY dissemination 
technology is included in this research, in addition to an FDNY survey of outgoing 
terrorism awareness students. FDNY Battalion Chief Thomas Robson developed and 
oversees the FDNY terrorism awareness class. The author of this thesis obtained 
permission from Chief Robson to use the data from his survey in this research. The 
survey was administered to over 500 FDNY terrorism awareness students to assess their 
usage of DiamondPlate, mobile technology such as apps and social media, awareness and 
readership of Watchline (an FDNY intelligence product), and how they obtain department 
news and information while off duty. The anonymous survey does not contain any 
personally identifiable information. The analysis of this survey highlights potential 
information-sharing and intelligence gaps that currently exist within the FDNY.  
(5) Types and Modes of Analysis 
The focus of this project is to provide a set of recommendations for improved 
information sharing and intelligence dissemination within and by the FDNY. The thesis 
uses a policy analysis to expose intelligence gaps that currently exist within the FDNY. 
Next, it identifies how these gaps are affecting the situational awareness of FDNY 
personnel. Then it presents a comparative analysis of specific technologies that could 
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help the department determine its best options for improving current dissemination 
policies and practices. Last, with these potential technological improvements, it provides 
a new framework for the handling of suspicious activity reporting within the FDNY in 
conjunction with the NYPD and the Joint Terrorism Task Force.  
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II. THE STATE OF FDNY INTELLIGENCE AND 
INFORMATION SHARING TODAY 
The situational awareness of the FDNY’s personnel is greatly tied to how well the 
department collects and disseminates intelligence from its members and outside agencies. 
If the FDNY can properly collect, vet, and disseminate intelligence to its workforce in 
real time, members can have enhanced astuteness to the environment around them. These 
members can then use that improved situational awareness to contribute to the IC and LE. 
Most importantly, enhanced situational awareness could positively impact the safety of 
fellow members of the department.  
This chapter analyzes the procedural and tactical literature of the FDNY to better 
understand the current state of FDNY intelligence. It also synthesizes this collection of 
documents to identify potential gaps in members’ situational awareness and the 
dissemination of information within the FDNY. The analysis includes recommendations 
from the McKinsey report, which reviewed the department after 9/11; the FDNY’s use of 
push–pull intelligence; the FDNY’s use of geographic information system (GIS) 
technology; and an analysis of FDNY metadata from the department’s web-based 
information-sharing platform, DiamondPlate. 
A. MCKINSEY REPORT 
McKinsey & Company’s August 2002 report examined the FDNY’s response to 
9/11 by analyzing how the department shared information during and after the event.29 
According to the FDNY, “McKinsey & Company spent five months working with 
Department personnel to develop recommendations to enhance the Fire Department’s 
readiness and preparedness.”30 The independent report provides insight into how the 
department can increase operational preparedness as well as improve planning and 
management, communications, and technology capabilities.31 Of the recommendations 
                                                 
29 McKinsey & Company, Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness. 
30 Ibid., 3. 
31 Ibid. 
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from the McKinsey report, several are still relevant some fourteen years later. This 
research focuses on two of these recommendations—enhanced communications 
processes and technologies, as well as efficient information sharing at all levels of 
government. The FDNY’s commitment to implementing and improving upon these 
recommendations could lead to better dissemination of intelligence and, in turn, better 
situational awareness for all FDNY members.   
While the department has aligned itself with many of McKinsey’s 
recommendations, internal information sharing and external intelligence sharing still 
require attention. Improvements are still needed with initiatives to enhance the push and 
pull of vital information to and from the workforce, establish interoperable 
communication infrastructure and protocol, improve inter-agency exchange of 
intelligence, and ensure this intelligence is shared quickly during emergencies and routine 
operations.32  
The McKinsey report explains that while several initiatives between senior 
leaders of the NYPD and FDNY began after 9/11, more needs to be done.33 Efforts from 
both agencies as well as from other homeland security partners are a step in the right 
direction. However, over a decade later, the same message still holds true—more can be 
done. The significance of this message is especially evident when analyzing current 
FDNY intelligence dissemination practices. While the McKinsey report provides some 
important insight into FDNY culture and processes, there are some glaring omissions. 
Though the report points out the urgent need for better critical information sharing 
between agencies, it does not address how to better disseminate intelligence to all 
members of the FDNY. Nor does it provide recommendations to improve inter-agency 
intelligence sharing that aids in prevention and deterrence of terrorism. If these were 
addressed, the safety of members would be improved. These gaps remain some of the 
FDNY’s biggest counterterrorism challenges to date. While McKinsey & Company 
recognized the importance of information sharing, the NYPD shares very little pertinent 
information with the FDNY. And while the FDNY has made efforts to improve 




information sharing within the department, it remains an uphill battle with often slow and 
inefficient dissemination as the result.    
B. PUSH–PULL INTELLIGENCE 
The FDNY needs to do a better job of “pulling” information from the outer edge 
of the workforce and then “pushing” that vetted intelligence out to the entire department, 
as described by FDNY Deputy Chief Thomas Currao.34 This intelligence comprises 
observations of front-line FDNY members in the field. This raw information may prove 
useful and could become part of a finished intelligence product. It is possible that front-
line members of the FDNY, as well as those in the IC and LE, would benefit from 
additional human intelligence from homeland security professionals on the ground. 
Sharing FDNY intelligence with other organizations like DHS and the NYPD would 
strengthen the intelligence capabilities of LE and the IC.   
Chief Currao’s article is the only FDNY source that discusses the difference 
between the push and pull of intelligence for the fire service. This document on fire 
service intelligence contends, “The ‘pull’ of information refers to what the fire service 
needs, with regard to information and intelligence necessary in order to prepare, train and 
operate within a multi-faceted and often dynamic threat. The ‘push’ occurs as this 
information is processed, analyzed and viewed through our unique lens.”35 Improved 
information sharing within the department begins with clear policies and procedures.  
The department recognizes the value of timely reporting of vital information. For 
example, if a unit has an unusual occurrence while working with another city agency, it 
must notify headquarters of the particular details within twenty-four hours. According to 
FDNY regulations, the Bureau of Operations must receive the unusual occurrence report 
via facsimile no later than 0900 hours the following business day.36 This is to ensure that 
chiefs at the highest level are aware of the incident, in case another city agency calls to 
                                                 
34 “Make the Right Call,” Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness, Fire Department of the City 
of New York, September 12, 2014 [FDNY intranet]. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY), Regulations: Chapter 30 (DCN: 1.09.02) (New 
York: FDNY, 1997), 6; FDNY, Regulations: Chapter 11 (DCN: 3.01.00) (New York: FDNY), 20. 
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discuss the event. The same commitment to quickly sharing intelligence with other 
agencies or even the outer edge of the FDNY workforce is missing in the FDNY’s 
official publications. Improving FDNY policy on information sharing will allow the 
department to streamline the pulling of potential intelligence from a front-line member. 
The department can then utilize specific technologies to push that information to the 
workforce. Perhaps a more efficient information-sharing procedure will enhance 
members’ situational awareness. There is no tactical or procedural literature like Chief 
Currao’s article found within fire department manuals. His article was published 
internally on DiamondPlate, but, ironically, was not widely dispersed.  
C. WATCHLINE 
One type of FDNY product pushing intelligence to the outer edge of the 
workforce is Watchline. The FDNY’s expanded role within the IC is evident through this 
report’s weekly dissemination. According to the FDNY’s 2011 Counterterrorism and 
Risk Management Strategy, Watchline “sets the standard of fire service intelligence, is 
distributed both internally and externally, reaches 100 agencies from all levels of 
government and more than 1,000 direct subscribers outside the FDNY.”37 The overall 
readership is even more substantial. The publication asserts email forwarding by 
department members as well as outside agencies from around the world has increased 
weekly readership to more than 40,000 consumers.38 Watchline is the only intelligence 
product from the FDNY or any other agency in the nation that finds its way into the 
hands of front-line FDNY members. This is an essential tool to help inform members of 
current threats and enhance their situational awareness.  
  
                                                 




D. PASS IT ON PROGRAM 
Despite the major loss of seasoned firefighters on 9/11, the FDNY still has some 
of the most experienced members of any fire department. According to Jennifer Fermino, 
“The 1,747,345 calls the FDNY responded to in 2015 was 6.4% higher than the previous 
year’s number.”39 As one of the busiest departments in the country, even the newest 
members have experiences to share. The FDNY started a program in 1997 called Pass It 
On. According to the department, the program was designed to relay experiences quickly 
and accurately to the field so that members of the department may save someone’s life 
tomorrow.40 Hard copies of these bulletins are sent to field units via department 
messenger vehicle. These bulletins are only accessible from within the firehouse or EMS 
station where they are posted for on-duty members to review. Disseminating this type of 
information in this manner leads to inconsistent viewership. In addition to potentially 
saving someone’s life, the Pass It On Program captures the details of an emergency call 
to help make mitigation easier in the future. The flyer in Figure 1 represents an example 
of a Pass it On Program memo affecting the situational awareness of everyday response. 
                                                 
39 Jennifer Fermino, “Record Number of Fire Calls.” 
40 FDNY, “Pass It On Program,” (Safety Bulletin 90, FDNY, October 13, 2015), 1. 
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Figure 1.  Pass It On Program Document41 
 
                                                 
41 Photo obtained from the quarters of Engine 247.  
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E. DIAMONDPLATE  
DiamondPlate is the FDNY’s agency-wide intranet information system. 
According to a Fire Engineering article by FDNY Chief Ronald Spadafora and FDNY 
Director of Technology Thomas Dowling, the FDNY lost an immense amount of 
experience and expertise after the 9/11 attack.42 This type of knowledge was not easily 
replaced. The two authors suggest, “DiamondPlate was born out of a need to preserve the 
collective knowledge that the FDNY builds on every day.”43 Through proper planning 
and grant funding, DiamondPlate continues on as the only digital information-sharing 
platform between the FDNY and its members.  
1. DiamondPlate Data 
This section analyzes metadata from the DiamondPlate platform. The platform’s 
management team at FDNY headquarters provided metadata for the first two quarters of 
2016. The data are supposed to reach all of  the FDNY’s firehouses —218 of them—
along with 34 EMS stations, 10,322 fire personnel, and 3,675 EMS personnel.44 
DiamondPlate data are emailed to specific FDNY personnel and present the usage and 
reach of the department’s intranet platform. DiamondPlate does not track unique views. 
More specifically, it does not track individual users, which would require users to log in. 
Aside from a posted copy, DiamondPlate is where members can read a digital copy of  
Watchline.  
Before analyzing the data, it is important to understand the definition of the terms 
“visit” and “view” as they are used in the datasets. Opening a web browser that goes 
directly to DiamondPlate’s homepage counts as one visit. A visit is terminated when the 
user closes the browser or after a period of inactivity (no movement of mouse or 
webpage) lasting more than a few minutes. A view occurs when someone clicks on a 
                                                 
42 Thomas Dowling and Ronald Spadafora, “FDNY DiamondPlate,” Fire Engineering 166, no. 5 
(May 2013): 30. 
43 Ibid. 
44 “FDNY Vital Statistics Fiscal Year 2014,” accessed March 6, 2017, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/ 
pdf/vital_stats_2014_fy.pdf. 
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particular story of interest, and the browser takes that person to a specific page. Views are 
supposed to provide an accurate reflection of total pages seen.  
a. 2016 First Quarter Data 
The total number of locations reporting included 218 firehouses, 34 EMS stations, 
16 administrative locations at headquarters, the fire academy, Fort Totten, and three 
Bureau of Fire Investigation locations. From January 1 to March 31, the total number of 
visits for the first quarter (Q1) was 71,721. There were seventy-seven feature stories that 
included terrorism-related information, medical response considerations, training 
information, and internal intelligence. There were 18,989 total views for a seven-day 
period. Dividing the total number of views by 77 features yields an average of 247 views 
per feature. Data collection stopped after seven days. 
Views for one EMS story were a bit of an anomaly. This particular story on new 
spinal motion restriction protocol produced 2,494 views. Without the EMS feature, there 
were 16,495 total views. Notably, there was no metric for unique views. The Center for 
Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness (CTDP) writes most of the terrorism and situational 
awareness features, including Watchline. This group released sixteen articles about 
terrorism-related activity both domestically and abroad. These articles averaged 184 
views over a seven-day period.  
b. 2016 Second Quarter Data 
From April 1 to June 30, the total number of visits for the second quarter (Q2) 
was 58,908. There were seventy-six feature stories that included terrorism-related 
information, medical response considerations, training information, and internal 
intelligence relating to operations and situational awareness. There were 19,610 total 
views for a seven-day period. Dividing the total views by 76 features equals an average 
of 258 views per feature. As in the first quarter, there was no metric for unique views. 
The CTDP published twenty-one featured articles about terrorism-related activity both 
domestically and abroad. These articles averaged 160 views over a seven-day period. The 
metrics once again stopped after seven days. 
 23 
2. DiamondPlate Data Analysis 
When looking at the number of views per story over a seven-day span, one could 
infer that information presented on DiamondPlate is failing to reach field personnel. It 
appears that both fire and EMS personnel are not getting essential information in a timely 
manner. It is worthwhile to analyze the total number of visits for Q1 and Q2. The 
cumulative number of visits for Q1 and Q2 is 71,721 and 58,908, respectively. There was 
an approximate 18-percent drop in the total number of visits between Q1 and Q2 in 2016. 
Over a 90-day period, that is an average of approximately 797 visits per day for Q1 and 
approximately 655 visits per day for Q2. These visits to DiamondPlate do not necessarily 
mean that Watchline is seen. A user has to navigate through DiamondPlate to find  
Watchline.  
Other factors could impact several DiamondPlate metrics. It is a cultural practice 
that many front-line officers use the computer kiosk, rather than office computers, at least 
twice a day to enter an electronic riding list. If an officer opens the web browser at the 
kiosk to enter the riding list, it counts as one visit. With over 420 fire units within the 
FDNY, it is possible that the majority of visits are due to riding list entries. With one 
officer per unit entering a riding list twice per day over the course of one quarter, or 90 
days, there is the potential for over 75,600 visits to DiamondPlate just for riding list 
entries. One can infer from the data that a high percentage of visits to DiamondPlate may 
be coming from riding list entries. 
The views metric helps gauge how well each story reaches the outer edge of the 
workforce. For Q1, there was an average of 247 views per feature. Without the EMS 
protocol article, the average view per feature drops to 217 out of almost 14,000 FDNY 
fire and EMS personnel. Notably, there is no metric for unique views. For example, if a 
user leaves a particular story of interest (one view) due to a call, reopening the browser 
later to return to the feature counts as another visit and view. This suggests that there may 
be an even greater lack of dissemination among members. The average views of featured 
stories in Q2 suggest the same condition. 
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Assessing the effectiveness of Watchline internal distribution is important to all 
front-line members. The material provided in Watchline is designed to enhance the 
overall situational awareness of all fire and EMS personnel. Data from the first two 
quarters of 2016 show that Watchline garners fewer than 200 views per week internally. 
This is only a small fraction of the 40,000 readers highlighted back in 2011.45 Notably, 
this statistic does not necessarily capture true internal readership. Watchline is sent via 
email to each fire company and at times is printed and posted in the common area of the 
firehouse. There is no FDNY policy or requirement to post this one-page intelligence 
product. All EMS battalions and stations are on the email distribution list, so it is possible 
that a hard copy is posted in these stations as well.  
F. GIS TECHNOLOGY AND ITS USE IN THE FIRE SERVICE 
Kenneth Foote and Margaret Lynch from the University of Colorado at Boulder 
recognize the importance of GIS to make better-informed decisions. Foote and Lynch 
describe GIS as “a special-purpose digital database in which a common spatial coordinate 
system is the primary means of reference.”46 Better decisions come from the capability of 
GIS to enter, store, and analyze selected data. According to Foote and Lynch, the GIS 
data process has to reflect the function for specific research for a specific task.47 GIS 
already aids senior leaders of the FDNY when they are making important strategic 
decisions regarding building inspections, coordination with local organizations such as 
the Department of Buildings and the Department of Environmental Protection, and 
logistical planning. Although GIS technology is already a part of FDNY culture, its 
capabilities remain in an infancy stage. The department could utilize GIS technology in 
other ways to benefit the safety of FDNY members and the citizens of New York.  
After recognizing the value of GIS technology, the FDNY started its own GIS 
Unit. The department uses GIS technology to map incidents around the city. The 
department uses ArcGIS Viewer for Flex for its Critical Response Infrastructure 
                                                 
45 FDNY, Counterterrorism and Risk Management Strategy, 9. 
46 Kenneth E. Foote and Margaret Lynch, “The Geographer’s Craft Project,” University of Colorado at 
Boulder, accessed December 19, 2016, http://www.colorado.edu/geography/gcraft/notes/intro/intro.html. 
47 Ibid. 
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Management System (CRIMS)’s web-mapping application. In the “Counterterrorism and 
Risk Management Strategy,” the FDNY describes CRIMS as “a secure, web-based, data 
management tool used to assist on-scene fire chiefs in evaluating critical infrastructure 
for situational awareness and risk assessment. CRIMS links data together on building 
construction, storage of hazardous material, in-building communication systems and 
digital blueprints of floor areas.”48 The FDNY’s GIS program has valuable data already 
stored on its database. Adding terrorism-related information for situational awareness to 
the GIS database can improve information sharing within the FDNY. 
The FDNY uses GIS software to collect different types of data to aid the 
department in understanding some of its greatest needs. This data is added as different 
layers to make each item easily identifiable. The FDNY’s GIS Unit uses the technology 
to plot locations of fire hydrants as well as to identify all frozen hydrants in the city. This 
data provides the FDNY’s Thawing Unit important information when deciding which 
critical areas to service first. The FDNY also uses GIS to map potential radioactive 
anomalies during the department’s annual radiological readings procedure. Radiological 
readings are taken from every firehouse during the first week in May and plotted in 
CRIMS to give a full radiological picture of the city. The readings allow senior leaders to 
make decisions in the event a radiological plume bears down on the city. Current GIS 
technology can embed pictures and portable document format (PDF) files into any point 
dropped on the map. Leaders monitoring CRIMS receive a live picture of what is going 
on at a particular incident. 
Other fire departments around the country are using GIS for a number of other 
purposes. GIS technology has enabled the Seminole Volunteer Fire Department in 
Virginia to respond to emergencies “faster, safer and more prepared.”49 In April 2007, 
this department implemented a GIS touchscreen system to its mobile computers. In 2010, 
the Baltimore Fire Department and the City of Baltimore were in a budgetary crisis and 
began using GIS technology to ensure proper response times were met after particular 
                                                 
48 FDNY, Counterterrorism and Risk Management Strategy. 
49 “Virginia Fire Department Uses Mobile GIS Technology to Help Incident Responses,” YouTube 
Video, 2:37, posted by “group1ted’s channel,” November 1, 2008, https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=ezETf1Gj8C4. 
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fire stations closed.50 GIS technology is slowly being implemented in a variety of 
homeland security enterprises.  
Like most organizations, the FDNY has a tremendous amount of information to 
share with its workforce. Much of this information could enhance the situational 
awareness of all department members. Due to a variety of evolving threats within the 
homeland, no information may be more critical to disclose to members than suspicious 
activity—especially from incidents experienced by FDNY members.  
Current FDNY GIS technology could provide an engaging platform for members 
to push and pull information to and from the department. The images in Figure 2 
represents an output of the FDNY’s GIS technology. This tool allows for important 
information to reach front-line members of the department. In theory, a unit within the 
FDNY would report suspicious activity or information impacting future operations and 
send that information to the GIS Unit. The GIS Unit could then share this information by 
pinning the incident on the map and including a PDF of the report and any images. 
 
Figure 2.  GIS Technology51 
                                                 
50 “Baltimore City (MD) Fire Department Uses GIS Technology to Optimize Resources,” Fire 
Engineering, September 20, 2011, http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/2011/09/baltimore-esri.html. 
51 Source: “Crime Mapping,” ecoSpatial Research Technologies, accessed December 19, 2016, 
http://www.ecospatialgis.com/. 
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G. DOCTRINAL ISSUES 
Many articles about situational awareness have been published by the FDNY on 
DiamondPlate to educate firefighters and medical personnel. Much of the content within 
this literature is tactical. It provides instructions for fire and medical personnel on how to 
handle particular emergencies. Although there is a wealth of information the FDNY gives 
its members to properly mitigate various incidents, there is little sharing across the 
organization that improves situational awareness, and thus safety, in the process. Very 
few FDNY publications discuss situational awareness. The emergency response plan 
(ERP) bulletin contains the strongest material meant to heighten members’ situational 
awareness. It includes a list that describes specific types of terrorist surveillance and 
activity. What becomes evident after reading this bulletin is a communication gap within 
the FDNY, and between the FDNY and other LE agencies.  
1. Suspicious Activity Reporting 
The dissemination of intelligence within the FDNY to raise situational awareness 
lags behind many standard practices of other departments and the private sector. One tool 
that most agencies use to share intelligence with one another is known as a suspicious 
activity report (SAR). According to DHS, “Prompt and detailed reporting of suspicious 
activities can help prevent violent crimes or terrorist attacks.”52 There are many incidents 
in which an FDNY unit experiences suspicious activity while in the normal course of 
action. In these instances, according to the FDNY “Regulations for the Uniformed 
Force,” the officer of the fire company is required to place a phone call to the next two 
levels of command and fill out an unusual occurrence report.53 An unusual occurrence 
report is similar to a SAR, but it is not always used in the same way. LE and the IC use 
SARs to share suspicious activity that might be related to terrorism or other crimes. 
FDNY members use an unusual occurrence report to document not only crime or 
terrorism-related activity but also non crime–related incidents. FDNY regulations require 
“a letterhead report containing a detailed description of the incident shall be forwarded 
                                                 
52 DHS, “Report Suspicious Activity,” March 4, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/how-do-i/report-
suspicious-activity. 
53 FDNY, Regulations: Chapter 30, 2.  
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through the chain of command to the Chief of Operations.”54 This process takes a hard 
copy of a letter containing details of the incident and sends it via department messenger 
vehicle to the appropriate level of command. Not only does this sequence of events take 
an inordinate amount of time, it is also an example of the silo of vertical intelligence 
dissemination that exists within the department. The FDNY can improve on current 
dissemination processes in order to be more efficient and effective.  
2. Strategy for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness 
The department recognizes the more significant role it plays in the IC but has yet 
to fully capitalize on its detection and deterrence capabilities. In 2007, the FDNY 
released its Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy to address the following 
challenges: terrorist threats, natural disasters, organizational adaptability, prevention and 
protection, planning, training, and coordination and collaboration. Within the prevention 
and protection section of the strategy, the department discusses its role in the 
information-sharing environment. The 2007 strategy reads, “In reaction to information 
gathered and based on the type of intelligence received, the FDNY can increase 
inspection activity to assist in detection or strategically locate additional resources to act 
as a terrorism deterrent.”55 While the FDNY can increase its activity, its detection and 
deterrence capabilities rely mostly on access obtained through its building inspection 
program and emergency responses.   
Within the 2007 Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy, the department 
describes an ongoing relationship with DHS that improves intelligence sharing between 
the two organizations. Very little of this information sharing makes its way to field EMS 
and fire personnel. As described in the strategy, “The FDNY … is working with the DHS 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) to establish a direct information conduit 
between the FDNY and DHS. By sharing pre-incident intelligence, field observation 
reports and real-time incident updates, this two-way exchange of information will 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 6. 
55 Michael R. Bloomberg, Nicholas Scoppetta, and Salvatore J. Cassano, Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy (New York: FDYN, 2007), 20, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/events/2007/tdps/ 
terrorism%20strategy_complete.pdf. 
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enhance both the FDNY’s and the nation’s preparedness efforts.”56 This relationship 
provides a great framework to build an enhanced inter-agency intelligence-sharing 
network. While information sharing between the FDNY and DHS is discussed in the 
2007 strategy, there are a couple of issues that currently affect this strategy. The first 
issue is the absence of dissemination of information to front-line members. If DHS I&A 
currently shares intelligence with the FDNY, front-line members are not seeing it. The 
other issue is the lack of horizontal dissemination of intelligence within the FDNY, and 
certainly to outside agencies as well. Although front-line members encounter suspicious 
behavior, there is no doctrine that describes how to share this intelligence with I&A.  
The FDNY recognizes the need to increase terrorism-prevention efforts by 
focusing on the intelligence collection capabilities of the department. As a result of 9/11, 
the 2007 strategy emphasizes, “Terrorism prevention is a role of the FDNY that needs to 
develop and grow.”57 To date, the FDNY has not published any follow-on documents 
that clearly educate front-line members about intelligence collection and dissemination 
procedures. The lack of FDNY information-sharing protocol doctrine demonstrates that 
the intelligence gaps leading up to 9/11 still exist today. The FDNY suggests, “The 
department could help fill some of these gaps by contributing to local intelligence-
gathering efforts. When routinely shared with intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
the information gathered by the FDNY personnel could make a significant contribution to 
existing intelligence and lead to the identification and disruption of terrorist activities.”58 
While the department has made efforts to increase its role in intelligence gathering, it 
struggles to disseminate this information to outside agencies and, most importantly, to the 
outer edge of the workforce. 
 





H. COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
Improving communication and intelligence sharing within the FDNY continues to 
be a main priority for senior leadership. In 2015, FDNY Commissioner Nigro testified 
before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security about 
confronting challenges in a post-9/11 world. This public testimony included 
improvements the FDNY has made in communications and intelligence sharing. The 
commissioner also discussed the importance of homeland security funding and how the 
department depends on that funding to continue to rebuild into a bigger and better asset to 
homeland security. 
Communication is a vital component of successful operations at any incident. 
According to the commissioner, “The department has successfully deployed a three-part 
field communications system that represents a critical step in improved fire-ground 
communications.”59 This field communication system is meant to thrive in the 
department’s new emergency operations center (EOC) that was purchased with federal 
funding. The commissioner notes, “One of the elements in this system is the concept of a 
Networked Command: Linking on-scene situational awareness capabilities with 
command and control level operations at the EOC.”60 These initiatives to connect field 
situational awareness with command-level personnel appear to be the major 
communications point in the testimony. The testimony does not discuss if or how the 
command-level of the FDNY ensures that the front-line situational awareness they 
receive at the EOC horizontally spreads to other front-line members at the scene. This 
situation is similar to the current intelligence-sharing framework within the FDNY.  
According to Nigro, the FDNY’s CTDP has “become an active producer of 
intelligence tailored to meet the needs of firefighters and emergency responders.”61 This 
intelligence comes through Watchline and provides valuable information to fire and EMS 
                                                 
59 “Confronting Terror Challenges in a Post 9/11 World,” testimony of FDNY Commissioner Daniel 






personnel to heighten their situational awareness. Based on the testimony of 
Commissioner Nigro, the FDNY uses only DiamondPlate to deliver this critical 
information to its workforce.62 The FDNY is not capturing its wider audience because of 
its reliance on DiamondPlate to share this intelligence. 
I. CONCLUSION 
While the FDNY has taken many steps to rebuild after the events of 9/11, internal 
information sharing and external intelligence sharing still need improvement. Although 
coordination at inter-agency incidents has improved, information sharing between the 
FDNY and the NYPD remains sparse. NYPD intelligence that could impact FDNY 
operations remains unshared. Internal information that could enhance the situational 
awareness of members is often placed in silos and not horizontally disseminated in an 
appropriate fashion. The department can close its intelligence loop by pulling information 
from the outer edge of the workforce. SAR integration and training has still not taken 
place within the FDNY. The DiamondPlate intranet platform is only used to push 
information. The department could benefit from using the virtual platform to pull 
information from personnel. 
  
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
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III. FDNY FIELD PERSONNEL INSIGHT 
Improving internal information sharing is essential if the FDNY wants to move 
forward with its role not only as an intelligence gatherer, but as a user of intelligence. 
Before the department proceeds with inter-agency intelligence sharing, it needs to refine 
the way it collects and analyzes its own information. Field personnel have information 
that could potentially save the lives of other members of the department. Without an 
efficient way to share these experiences, members’ situational awareness is degraded. 
This chapter highlights internal information-sharing gaps existing in the FDNY. By 
analyzing the responses to an internal FDNY survey, the department can formulate the 
most effective way to share this type of information going forward.  
A. FDNY SURVEY 
FDNY Battalion Chief Thomas Robson developed and oversees the FDNY 
terrorism awareness program to enhance the situational awareness of all FDNY 
personnel. A survey was administered between January 2014 and January 2015 to 500 
FDNY fire and EMS personnel who took the terrorism awareness class. Chief Robson 
has given permission for the data from the survey to be used in this thesis. The ten-
question survey was administered to 500 FDNY terrorism awareness students. Questions 
from the survey were used to assess the following from FDNY members: usage of 
DiamondPlate, mobile technology acceptance—including apps and social media—
readership of Watchline, and how department information is obtained while off duty. The 
anonymous survey responses do not contain any personally identifiable information. 
Students included both fire and EMS personnel with a variety of experience and years 
with the department. Analysis of this survey highlights potential information-sharing and 
intelligence gaps that currently exist within the FDNY. 
1. Survey Results 
Members were asked whether they used the FDNY DiamondPlate platform and, if 
so, the frequency of their use. The results were as follows: 256 out of 500 members 
(approximately 51 percent) used DiamondPlate. The frequency of use varied among 
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members. Seventy-eight members (approximately 30 percent) visited DiamondPlate once 
a tour. One hundred and two members (approximately 40 percent) visited DiamondPlate 
once a week. Fifty-three members (approximately 21 percent) visited DiamondPlate 
twice a week. Twenty-three members (approximately 9 percent) visited DiamondPlate 
once a month. Members were asked whether they knew about Watchline and, if so, 
whether they read it. The results were as follows: One hundred and fifty-three out of 500 
members (approximately 30 percent) did not know about Watchline. An additional fifty-
one members knew about Watchline but did not read it. Therefore, 204/500 members 
(approximately 40 percent) did not read Watchline. 
Members were asked whether they thought learning about suspicious activities 
was relevant to their jobs. The results were as follows: 498 out of 500 (approximately 99 
percent) felt learning about suspicious activities was relevant to their jobs. Members were 
asked whether they use apps on their smartphones and whether they would be interested 
in learning about suspicious activity via a smartphone app. The results were as follows: 
469 out of 500 (approximately 93 percent) used apps on their smartphones. Four-hundred 
and twenty-three out of 500 (approximately 85 percent) expressed wanting to learn of 
suspicious activity via an app. Members were asked whether they already used any 
informational apps that share department events and news. The results were as follows: 
316 out of 500 (approximately 63 percent) used NYC FireWire,63 GroupMe, or Twitter 
to learn of department activity or news.  
2. Analysis 
Five hundred surveys were used to glean information from front-line fire and 
EMS personnel to identify potential information-sharing gaps within the department. The 
author of this research recognizes this amount is only a small sample of the FDNY 
organization. The results of this survey suggest that only half of the members surveyed 
actually use DiamondPlate. DiamondPlate is the only technology that the department uses 
                                                 
63 NYC FireWire is a Facebook page that informs followers of FDNY emergencies and newsworthy 
events going on around New York City. An FDNY member manages the page, but the content on the page 
is not affiliated with or controlled by the FDNY. 
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to share intelligence and information with its members. This creates a potential 
information-sharing gap within the FDNY.  
There are a few reasons for low DiamondPlate usage. First, members do not have 
access to this platform while off duty. Firefighter access is limited to the time on duty and 
physically inside the firehouse. Another possible reason is, even if time permits, there is 
only one computer kiosk in each firehouse. This lone workstation is insufficient for 
accommodating four to ten firefighters working a given shift. Time spent away from the 
firehouse while on duty is another cause for poor viewership. Fire companies are engaged 
in inspection activities that severely limit access to the DiamondPlate kiosk in the 
firehouse. In 2007, after the tragic Deutsche Bank building fire, the department added a 
third day of building inspection to the workweek. This extra day makes for a total of nine 
hours of building inspections per week. Hydrant inspections take place twice a week for a 
total of six hours. Random complaints that require inspections are not factored into any of 
these estimates but can add hours in excess of those already counted.  
Another daily activity that keeps members away from DiamondPlate information 
is training. The department maintains a very rigorous training schedule to ensure all 
members are up to date on the latest procedures and mitigation techniques for a variety of 
emergencies. Six days a week there is a daily training schedule that is released to field 
companies. Units are assigned to specific training that can include any one of the 
following: ropes and personal safety system (PSS),64 motor vehicle extrication, search 
and rescue, emergency self-contained breathing apparatus procedures, and fire scenarios, 
among others. Depending on the assigned training, fire companies are required to drive 
apparatuses to the fire academy or other designated training locations throughout the city. 
This travel time detracts from any possible professional development that DiamondPlate 
                                                 
64 The PSS is a rope-and-hook anchoring system that is attached to a firefighter’s personal harness. 
Members can use this system as a last resort in the event they must bail out of a burning building. This 
system came into operation as a result of the Black Sunday fire that occurred on January 23, 2005. Six 
firefighters were forced to jump out of the fourth-floor window while operating above the fire. FDNY 
Lieutenant Curtis Meyran, the covering officer of Ladder Company 27, and Ladder 27 Chauffeur 
Firefighter John Bellew died as a result of their injuries. Lt. Joseph DiBernardo passed away in 2011 as a 
result of injuries sustained from fighting the Black Sunday fire. 
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has to offer. In addition to these factors, fire and EMS personnel never receive training on 
how to appropriately use the computer kiosk and the DiamondPlate platform.  
Unfortunately, EMS personnel have even less access to DiamondPlate 
information. Although the EMS schedule has members working more days per week than 
firefighters (five days on and two days off, versus two twenty-four-hour shifts), their 
work life is not conducive to DiamondPlate access. These members spend almost their 
entire shifts on ambulances at specific city intersections. While on the ambulance, EMS 
personnel have no access to DiamondPlate, which inhibits their professional 
development. For the brief time they spend in the EMS station, there is only one 
computer kiosk for approximately twenty EMS workers. Perhaps the limited 
DiamondPlate access has caused a lack of buy-in within EMS culture.  
Watchline is the only traditional intelligence product that is published for all 
FDNY personnel. Approximately 70 percent of those surveyed knew about Watchline. 
However, it is interesting that there was a ten-percent drop between quarters in the 
amount of people actually reading Watchline. It is possible limited access to the product 
is causing the 40-percent lack of readership among front-line members. Another potential 
reason for lack of internal readership is that Watchline is not a real-time intelligence 
product.  
FDNY members are often placed in harm’s way. It is this type of experience that 
could have produced the overwhelming number of those surveyed (approximately 
99 percent) to feel that learning about suspicious activity is relevant to their jobs. The 
vast majority (approximately 93 percent) of those surveyed use apps on their 
smartphones. Approximately 85 percent would like to learn about suspicious activities 
via a smartphone app. Perhaps using this type of technology might allow for better 
dissemination of suspicious activity, which in turn could enhance the overall situational 
awareness of FDNY personnel.  
Approximately 63 percent of survey participants already use some type of mobile 
app to glean department-related information. The department uses two Twitter accounts 
to share information. @FDNY is used to share public information and safety tips and  
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@FDNYalerts is a notification feed from FDNY operations. This account, however, is 
automated, not monitored. Information posted to @FDNYalerts is limited and only 
pertains to fires or major emergencies going on around the city. If the department can 
expand the sharing of information with members using these types of apps, members 
potentially have a better chance of going home safely. While the DiamondPlate data 
shows infrequent use by the workforce, at least 70 percent of those surveyed use 
DiamondPlate at least once per week. 
The FDNY can improve on its intelligence and information-sharing processes. 
While DiamondPlate offers some of the best training and situational awareness content 
the department has to offer, it appears that much of that knowledge does not reach front-
line personnel. Utilizing mobile applications could lead to an improved information-
sharing platform within the FDNY. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The manner in which the department is sharing information needs improvement. 
The survey data supports the need for improving situational awareness information and 
intelligence dissemination within the FDNY. While DiamondPlate continues its 
dominance as the information-sharing hub of the FDNY, alternative means are necessary 
to reach all members of the department. Members are concerned they are not receiving 
critical situational awareness information that could potentially save their lives. There is 
current technology in place to help the organization with such an endeavor. The greatest 
challenge now is how one of the biggest fire departments in the country can adopt change 
while avoiding many of the organizational change barriers that lie ahead. Perhaps 
acknowledging the barriers and their impact on the FDNY can aid positive change. This 
could allow the FDNY to build a lasting framework that improves intelligence 
dissemination to all members. FDNY intelligence collection and dissemination have 
taken steps forward since 9/11. While this progress is encouraging, recent terrorist plots 
in New York City and surrounding areas support the need for further intelligence 
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development within the FDNY.65 With proper training, the access provided to FDNY 
members can provide enhanced human intelligence to LE and IC. By sharing all properly 
vetted suspicious activity the FDNY encounters, LE and the IC can get a better picture of 
what is actually going on in the city. 
  
                                                 
65 Emanuella Grinberg et al., “NY, NJ Bombings: Suspect Charged with Attempted Murder of 
Officers,” CNN, September 19, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/19/us/new-york-explosion-
investigation/.  
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THEORIES AND BARRIERS 
There is vast amount of research on organizational change, and yet companies 
continue to struggle to successfully implement the modifications they seek. Like many 
agencies, organizational change does not come easily for the FDNY. The department has 
had its own successes and failures when trying to make alterations. According to Rick 
Maurer, estimates show any type of organizational change has a 70 percent failure rate.66 
Studying an organization like the FDNY can reveal many possibilities for why changes 
are so difficult to implement. Work by Harold J. Leavitt, Joseph Mosca and Stuart 
Rosenberg, and other organizational change scholars provides insight into what types of 
change barriers exist and how to avoid their pitfalls. This chapter analyzes organizational 
change barriers that potentially restrain the FDNY from adopting new communication 
technologies. 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THEORIES  
Mosca and Rosenberg from Monmouth University have studied specific barriers 
to organizational change. While scholars agree on the level of organizational change 
failure, they do not agree on its causes.67 After conducting an exhaustive study of 
organizational resistance to change, Mosca and Rosenberg compiled the following top-
twenty impediments:  
1. Employees’ attitudes/disposition toward change 
2. Fear of the unknown (uncertainty) 
3. Lack of understanding of the firm’s intentions 
4. Fear of failure 
5. Disruption of routine 
                                                 
66 Rick Maurer, “Applying What We’ve Learned about Change,” Journal for Quality and 
Participation 33, no. 2 (July 2010): 35. 
67 Joseph Mosca and Stuart Rosenberg, “Breaking Down the Barriers to Organizational Change,” 
International Journal of Management and Information Systems 15, no. 3 (2011): 139, doi: 
10.19030/ijmis.v15i3.4650.  
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6. Increased workload (due to downsizing or employees leaving 
voluntarily/involuntarily) 
7. Lack of rewards for implementing change 
8. Perceived loss of control, security, or status 
9. Poor leadership 
10. Dysfunctional organizational culture 
11. Organizational size and rigidity 
12. Lack of management support for the change (organizational commitment) 
13. Lack of trust between management and employees 
14. Inability or unwillingness of management to deal with resistance 
15. Lack of participation due to top-down steering 
16. Organizational politics/conflict 
17. Internal conflict for resources 
18. Lack of consequences for inadequate or poor performance 
19. The content of the change (an ill-conceived change/relevance of the goals 
of change) 
20. Poor implementation planning68 
Mosca and Rosenberg break these factors into three groups. Items one through eight 
represent personal factors as barriers to change, nine through eighteen make up 
organizational issues negatively affecting change, and factors nineteen and twenty are 
problems with the change itself.69 The authors conclude that management is one of the 
most powerful resistances to change. Successful implementation cannot happen without 
managerial support. In many instances, managers will have to adopt whatever 
organizational change strategies work best for their organization.70 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 144. 
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Kenneth Hultman addresses different human behaviors affecting organizational 
change. In his article, Hultman describes the difference between active and passive 
resistance. Symptoms of active resistance include manipulating, sabotaging, 
undermining, and starting rumors. Passive resistance symptoms include when people 
agree verbally but do not follow through, fail to implement change, or stand idly by and 
allow change to fail. These types of behaviors express resistance to change but do not 
explain why the resistance occurs.71 
Other experts declare that resistance to change stems simply from a defense of the 
status quo. Ann Gilley, Jerry Gilley, and Marisha Godek compare an organization to the 
human body to better illustrate resistance to change. These authors believe that 
organizations, like human bodies, consist of sub-systems and processes functioning in 
unison to run efficiently. Gilley, Gilley, and Godek suggest, “The healthiest systems are 
dynamic, capable of recognizing and responding to change in a positive manner.”72 Both 
human bodies and organizations react similarly when confronted with a systemic change. 
According to the authors, “An organization’s immune system is like the human one, [it] 
protects against change (foreign objects or ideas) by erecting a powerful barrier in the 
form of people, policies, procedures, and the culture it creates to prevent change, 
regardless of the consequences.”73 Both individuals within the organization and the 
organization itself have immune systems to change. Gilley, Gilley, and Godek suggest 
two-way communication and employee involvement can disarm the immune system by 
keeping all members informed and involved in the change.74  
Just as some scholars highlight specific organizational change barriers, others 
focus on positive behaviors helping organizations to implement change. Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter, Barry A. Stein, and Todd D. Jick present ten commandments for executing 
change:  
                                                 
71 Kenneth E. Hultman, “Scaling the Wall of Resistance,” Training and Development 49, no. 10 
(October 199): 15. 
72 Ann Gilley, Jerry W. Gilley, and Marisha Godek, “Change, Resistance, and the Organizational 
Immune System,” SAM Advanced Management Journal 74 (September 2009): 5. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 9. 
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1. Analyze the organization and its need for change. 
2. Create a shared vision and common direction. 
3. Separate from the past. 
4. Create a sense of urgency. 
5. Support a strong leader role. 
6. Line up political sponsorship. 
7. Craft an implementation plan. 
8. Develop enabling structures. 
9. Communicate, involve people and be honest. 
10. Reinforce and institutionalize change.75 
Commandments three and four are highlighted as critical to successful change. 
Organizations cannot change without disengaging from their past. When looking to the 
future, an organization must isolate the structures and routines that no longer work and 
move clear of them. Organizational change comes more easily when companies are just 
about to fail.76 But, according to Kanter, Stein, and Jick, “When the need for action is not 
generally implicit, a change leader should generate a sense of urgency.”77 These ten 
commandments provide guidelines for any organizational change practitioner. However, 
according to Kanter, Stein, and Jick, failure to implement change can come from blatant 
incompetence, mismanagement, or even ignorance; commandments, after all, can be 
ignored or broken.78 
B. LEAVITT’S DIAMOND 
Harold J. Leavitt produced a model using distinct sets of approaches to 
organizational change. This model became known as Leavitt’s Diamond, a popular 
change-management framework. Scholarly articles often reference this framework when 
                                                 
75 Todd D. Jick, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, and Barry A. Stein, The Challenge of Organizational Change 
(New York: The Free Press, 1992), 383. 
76 Ibid., 375, 383. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 386. 
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discussing organizational change. Leavitt’s work views organizations as complex systems 
consisting of the following interacting variables: tasks, structure, technology, and 
people.79 Leavitt’s inclusion of technological change makes a fitting theory for this 
thesis.  
Each variable is defined in order to illuminate each specific change approach. 
Tasks/policy and process includes worker production as well as the various subtasks that 
exist in complex organizations.80 People refers to the workforce of an organization 
including members of management. Technology refers to digital problem-solving 
inventions like computers. Structure is defined as a system of communication and 
workflow.81 Figure 3 depicts the interdependent variables of Leavitt’s Diamond. 
 
Figure 3.  Leavitt’s Diamond82 
 
                                                 
79 Harold J. Leavitt, “Applied Organizational Change in Industry: Structural, Technological and 
Humanistic Approaches,” in Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March, 1144–1170 (Skokie, IL: 
Rand McNally, 1965), 1144. 
80 Leavitt’s Diamond originally used tasks to describe the actions of workers. Numerous studies have 
adapted this to include policy and processes.  
81 Leavitt, “Applied Organizational Change in Industry,” 1144. 
82 Source: Ibid., 1145. 
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Leavitt posits, “These four are highly interdependent … so that a change in any one 
usually results in a compensatory (or retaliatory) change in the others.”83 For example, 
Leavitt explains the introduction of a new technological tool, such as a computer, may 
positively or negatively affect the three other variables of the diamond. The introduction 
of a computer introduces changes to the system of communication (structure); the number 
of people, their skills, and activities (people); and performance (task), since some tasks 
will become achievable for the first time while others will become unnecessary.84  
C. SUCCESSFUL AND FAILED CHANGES IN THE FDNY 
Over the years, the FDNY has tried to evolve many times. The type of change and 
other organizational factors such as leadership and managerial support certainly affect the 
results of department change initiatives. In order to better understand what restrains the 
FDNY from making necessary changes, some examples of successful and failed changes 
are analyzed in this section. 
1. 2007 FDNY Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy 
An implementation of change is bound to fail if an organization does not 
recognize its own organizational change barriers. The 2007 Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness Strategy included a section on FDNY intelligence practices. This section 
discussed changing the FDNY’s role in terrorism prevention and information sharing. 
The department discussed various ways personnel could gather terrorism-related 
information through routine building inspections, arson investigations, and medical 
calls.85 What is missing in the FDNY strategy is a gap that still remains some nine years 
later: there is still no clear process on how to gather this type of information, nor how to 
share it. Current processes have potential terrorism-related information treated in the 
same manner as other non crime–related reports. 
                                                 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Bloomberg, Scoppetta, and Salvatore, Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy. 
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The intelligence section of the 2007 FDNY strategy is a failed change. Mosca and 
Rosenberg highlight poor implementation planning as a barrier to organizational change. 
This barrier is specific to the change itself.86 While the FDNY had implemented a new 
strategy to contribute more to LE and the IC, its implementation process was not 
effective. How can the FDNY share information with others effectively if the department 
does not share appropriately within itself? A proper strategy to change the way FDNY 
information is shared within the department is necessary. This will allow for better 
external communication with LE and the IC. 
According to Mosca and Rosenberg, the attitudes and dispositions of FDNY 
personnel are a potential barrier to change.87 It is reasonable to believe most firefighters 
and EMS personnel did not take their respective jobs to do intelligence work. Because 
these services are well respected by the public, a firefighter or EMT may feel that 
changing his or her role violates the trust between the responder and the citizen. This 
disposition among the workforce is not conducive to successful change. 
Leavitt’s theory suggests the FDNY changed the tasks of its members when it 
asked them to work as intelligence gatherers. The department never changed the 
structure, the way this information is shared, the people collecting the intelligence, nor 
the technology to allow for efficient collection and dissemination. Leavitt states these 
variables must change in order for the initial change to have a lasting effect.  
2. FDNY Suspicious Activity Reporting Program 
In October of 2011, graduate student Captain Christopher P. Ward wrote a policy 
memo on developing a SAR program for the FDNY. Captain Ward’s memo 
acknowledged communication areas within the FDNY needing improvement. 
Specifically, the information-sharing process within the FDNY at that time was 
stovepiping. One of the most forward-thinking recommendations in this policy memo is 
the addition of a SAR page on DiamondPlate to allow members the freedom to report 
                                                 
86 Mosca and Rosenberg, “Breaking Down Barriers,” 140. 
87 Ibid., 141. 
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suspicious activity at their own will.88 To date, no such SAR program exists in the 
FDNY. Gilley, Gilley, and Godek suggest a proposed change can trigger an 
organizational immune system response to defend the status quo.89 Captain Ward’s 
proposal was like an invasive germ in the organization’s system. According to Leavitt’s 
Diamond, developing an FDNY SAR program should have been successful. Changing 
the way terrorism-related information was shared affected the structure variable. 
Allowing any member to report suspicious activity changed the people variable. Adding a 
page to DiamondPlate changed the technology. Having members report suspicious 
activity through DiamondPlate changed the tasks variable. While it appears Leavitt’s 
Diamond was properly applied, this change still failed. Other barriers highlighted in this 
chapter negatively affected this change initiative. Mosca and Rosenberg suggest a lack of 
managerial support can prevent the change from taking place.90 
There is certainly controversy when discussing the role of first responders and 
intelligence collection. For years, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has raised 
questions regarding a firefighter’s role as an intelligence gatherer. According to Mike 
German, who served as the policy counsel for national security and privacy for the 
ACLU, the intent of a SAR program within the fire service is to turn firefighters into 
legally protected domestic spies.91 Shortly after the Los Angeles Police Department 
created its own SAR program, the ACLU released a report criticizing the program and 
others like it.92 According to Mosca and Rosenberg, this controversy makes it more 
difficult for FDNY senior leadership to support changing the role of first responders and 
developing an FDNY SAR program. In addition, losing the public’s trust affects the 
status of the FDNY, and is thus a barrier to implementing change.  
                                                 
88 FDNY Captain Chris Ward graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in 2014. He granted 
permission to use his policy memo in this thesis.  
89 Gilley, Gilley, and Godek, “Change, Resistance, and the Organizational Immune System,” 4. 
90 Mosca and Rosenberg, “Breaking Down Barriers,” 141. 
91 David Edwards and Muriel Kane, “Firefighters Asked to Report People Who Express Discontent 
with the Government,” Raw Story, November 29, 2007, http://www.rawstory.com/news/2007/ 
Homeland_Security_turns_firefighters_into_domestic_1129.html. 
92 “More about Suspicious Activity Reporting,” American Civil Liberties Union, accessed December 
14, 2016, https://www.aclu.org/other/more-about-suspicious-activity-reporting. 
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3. Emergency Action Message 
In 2010, Battalion Chief Thomas J. Richardson described an FDNY policy to 
disseminate information to responders in the field via an Emergency Action Message 
(EAM). This digital message was designed to provide front-line members with 
unclassified information to enhance their situational awareness. This new FDNY policy 
chose email as the method of delivery for all EAMs. Units out of quarters would have 
received notification via the apparatus mobile data terminal that a new EAM was waiting 
in the fire company’s email account.93 While this recommended communication change 
was innovative at the time, it was never accepted as FDNY practice.  
Many organizational change studies suggest there are several reasons why a 
change like this could have failed. The fact the EAM was a drafted policy means many of 
the organizational change barriers described by Mosca and Rosenberg were avoided. 
When getting this close to successful change, personal barriers do not apply. Resistance 
in any of Mosca and Rosenberg’s eight personal factors could not allow a drafted policy 
to make its way to senior leadership. Organizational barriers and change practices 
themselves are the only resistance to impede EAM implementation. In a bureaucracy, it is 
certainly believable that organizational politics are a barrier to change. It is possible by 
the time the EAM policy was ready for implementation, senior leadership no longer 
supported the project.  
The EAM project failed to follow Leavitt’s model because the FDNY 
implemented a new system of communication to share information that affected the 
structure variable but did not account for other variables in the diamond. In this instance, 
the new method of communication, the EAM, relied on email as the technology to 
disseminate information. There was a dependence on technology already in place. There 
were no policy guidelines sent to members to explain their new tasks at work to receive 
the EAM. Perhaps the number of people working on the project was insufficient to help 
create successful change. This attempted change was not the only instance in which an 
innovative idea for the FDNY failed to take hold. 
                                                 
93 Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices,” 71. 
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4. DiamondPlate Implementation 
Although many innovative change initiatives have failed in the FDNY, there are a 
few that have been implemented successfully. The creation of DiamondPlate is one 
example of a successful change. Diamond Plate is a web-based training and situational 
awareness tool that changed the way the department disseminated information to its 
members. The FDNY lost an immense amount of experience and expertise after 9/11.94 
This type of knowledge is not easily replaced. DiamondPlate was borne out of a need to 
preserve the collective knowledge that the FDNY builds on every day.95 Through proper 
planning and grant funding, DiamondPlate continues on as the only digital information-
sharing platform between the FDNY and its members.  
Successful DiamondPlate implementation could provide a roadmap for changing 
the way the department communicates with its members. According to Leavitt’s 
Diamond, DiamondPlate was successfully implemented because the three other 
interdependent variables changed. The project charter for DiamondPlate included the 
requirement for the technology to deliver a broad range of information to members in the 
field quickly and efficiently.96 Front-line members chosen by bureau heads worked with 
technical support staff to produce content based on their subject-matter expertise. A new 
technology, Adobe Creation, was introduced to writers and publishers of DiamondPlate 
content. 
Multiple groups consisting of both uniformed and non-uniformed personnel 
worked seamlessly to get DiamondPlate up and running. These groups included FDNY 
Operations, the Bureau of Technology Development and Systems, the Bureau of 
Training, and the CTDP, among many others.97 Overhauling the manner in which the 
department communicated with its members was certainly an invasive change. Gilley, 
Gilley, and Godek suggest the department’s two-way communication and employee 
involvement throughout the change could disarm its immune system. By keeping 
                                                 





members informed and providing participants with a voice, DiamondPlate saw successful 
implementation.98 Although this thesis has questioned the effectiveness of the 
DiamondPlate platform as an information-sharing tool, it is noteworthy that 
DiamondPlate managed to successfully navigate through many organizational change 
barriers.  
5. FDNY Rescue Task Force 
One of the more recent successful changes in the FDNY is the creation of a rescue 
task force (RTF). In response to events like the Pulse Nightclub shooting in Orlando, the 
FDNY created a team of firefighters and EMS personnel to rescue trapped civilians 
during an active-shooter incident. Other departments introduced the modern concept of a 
Rescue Task Force years before the FDNY.99 Although the FDNY is one of the largest 
departments in the country, the current threat environment pushed the FDNY to rethink 
active-shooter procedures. This change came swiftly, as multiple Rescue Task Forces 
were staffed around the city during specific holidays and events.100  
In order to successfully change FDNY procedures, Mosca and Rosenberg suggest 
senior-level staff chiefs must support the idea and lead the workforce through the 
transition period. Every variable of Leavitt’s Diamond was successfully changed when 
the tasks of firefighters and EMS personnel were changed. The example shows a 
thoughtful account for the people variable in Leavitt’s Diamond, as the appropriate 
number of personnel were trained as Rescue Task Force members. Leavitt’s structural 
variable manifested in the special training given to members to communicate with NYPD 
on the scene, which affected the structure variable. The technology variable was changed 
with the distribution of new ballistic gear. 
                                                 
98 Gilley, Gilley, and Godek, “Change, Resistance, and the Organizational Immune System,” 9. 
99 David K. Tan, “Rescue Task Force Is Best Medical Response to Active Shooter Incident,” 
EMS1.com, October 8, 2015, https://www.ems1.com/rescue-task-force/articles/13305048-Rescue-Task-
Force-is-best-medical-response-to-an-active-shooter-incident/. 
100 Susan Edelman and Kenneth Garger, “City Program Sends Unarmed Firefighters and EMTs into 
‘Active Shooter’ Situations,” New York Post, October 2, 2016, http://nypost.com/2016/10/02/city-program-
sends-unarmed-firefighters-and-emts-into-active-shooter-situations/. 
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6. Bunker Gear and Personal Safety System 
Other successful changes in the FDNY include the introduction of bunker gear to 
firefighters and the distribution of personal safety systems (PSS) to all fire personnel. 
Unlike the DiamondPlate implementation, which was proactive, these changes were 
reactive to specific events. In 1994, FDNY Captain John Drennan, Firefighter 
Christopher Siedenburg, and Firefighter James Young died while battling a blaze in 
Manhattan that is now known as the Watts Street fire. According to Chief Dennis Martin 
of the National Association of Chiefs of Police and Firefighters, “Bunker pants could 
have minimized the injuries … they are a necessity.”101 At the time, other major cities 
around the United States had bunker gear as standard issue. Richard M. Duffy, the 
director of health and safety for the International Association of Firefighters, said that 
New York was one of the last big cities without bunker gear.102  
In 2005, five firefighters and one lieutenant were forced to jump out of a five-
story window. Three FDNY members died as a result of this tragedy. The other three 
survived but sustained life-altering injuries.103 Similar to the tragic events of the Watt 
Street fire, PSS were not distributed to all fire personnel until after the loss of these 
members. PSS eventually came to members in the field after an extensive piloting 
program. Members were given PSS from different companies and designs to assess 
functionality and comfort. Their feedback was given to subject-matter experts and senior 
leadership on each specific design. Chief of Training for the FDNY Thomas Galvin said, 
“Whenever the department suffers a fatal fire, we take a constructive, critical look at the 
event.”104 Using firefighter feedback, the department was able to institute a change that 
has since saved the lives of several firefighters. 
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There are certain common threads shared in these examples of positive change. In 
both the PSS and bunker gear examples, management supported the change. Mosca and 
Rosenberg assert, “There cannot be any resistance on the part of management in order for 
the organizational change to be successfully implemented.”105 In an organization the size 
of the FDNY, it seems that without support of senior-level leaders, any change is doomed 
to fail. A pilot program for each change is also a shared trait. Gilley, Gilley, and Godek 
support the idea of implementing change gradually. The authors suggest that people 
perceive gradual change as more manageable and adjust much better to changes that 
occur slowly.106 Research by Mosca and Rosenberg also supports this notion. They 
explain that incorporating change incrementally allows for diminished risk if the change 
does not seem to work.107 The idea of incorporating change slowly and incrementally 
supports an FDNY piloting program for any change endeavor.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Studying examples of both failed and successful FDNY change along with the 
organizational change theories can help define some of the barriers that prevent the 
FDNY from further evolving. Without the right execution, any attempt to change 
something within the FDNY is bound for the abyss. The vast majority of change in the 
FDNY occurs in a reactive rather than a proactive fashion. Initiatives that failed to 
change the department include the 2007 FDNY intelligence strategy, the development of 
an FDNY SAR program, and the implementation of an EAM. The FDNY continues to 
have some of the organizational change barriers presented in this chapter. Leavitt’s 
framework of changing all four variables did not lead to successful change in the FDNY 
SAR initiative. The failed examples all share a lack of managerial support as a potential 
factor for organizational change resistance.  
Analyzing the positive FDNY change examples could provide future endeavors 
with a blueprint for successful implementation. Successful FDNY change initiatives 
                                                 
105 Mosca and Rosenberg, “Breaking Down Barriers,” 144. 
106 Gilley, Gilley, and Godek, “Change, Resistance, and the Organizational Immune System,” 7. 
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include changing the way information is shared with members through DiamondPlate 
technology, the creation of an FDNY Rescue Task Force, and the addition of new safety 
equipment such as bunker gear and PSS. DiamondPlate proved the department can 
implement successful changes in a proactive manner. These examples validate Mosca and 
Rosenberg’s theory that managerial support and leadership is needed for successful 
modifications to take place. All successful examples validate Kanter, Stein, and Jick’s 
theory that it is critical to move away from ineffective past practices to allow for 
successful change to have effect. 
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V. MOBILE TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE THE 
DISSEMINATION OF FDNY THREAT AND SAFETY 
INFORMATION 
The FDNY is not known for groundbreaking technology. In fact, it was not until 
2010 that carbon paper was finally retired from use. The department has slowly begun to 
recognize the need for incorporating technology into the everyday work life of FDNY 
members. From electronic riding lists to digital files for building inspections, the FDNY 
is slowly evolving into a more technologically advanced workplace. This chapter 
explores a concept of operations for an FDNY app to help the FDNY better disseminate 
information to its members.  
A. FDNY MOBILE APP 
Developing an FDNY app could enhance the safety of all department personnel. 
As DiamondPlate use and survey data suggest, many members in the FDNY remain 
uninformed. This lack of awareness creates an unsafe condition during responses and 
inhibits potential information sharing among members. An app helps solve the problem 
of reaching off-duty members as opposed to only those physically working at a firehouse 
or EMS station. This type of communication could enhance the situational awareness of 
members by covering a range of topics. There are several websites and social media 
pages that piece together some of this information. Having one platform could provide 
members with a one-stop shop for necessary information. An app can also connect the 
fire and EMS sides of the FDNY by providing meaningful information that is relevant to 
both types of personnel. The information on the official FDNY app must be vetted for 
full transparency and accuracy. Many of the information-sharing sites used by members 
contain rumors and misinformation.108 An FDNY app could include the following 
features in its platform:  
 
                                                 
108 Websites and Facebook pages like NYC FireWire and FDNY Rant provide unofficial department 
information. While much of the information is useful, there are too many rumors and falsehoods about 
events that impact their accuracy. Current members access these information-sharing sites especially when 
off duty with no access to department information.  
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• GIS  
• Fire and emergency response feed 
• Pass It On Program 
• FDNY procedures 
• Department orders 
• SARs or unusual occurrences 
• Watchline 
• Watchline Alert 
All of these subjects impact the situational awareness of first responders. Figure 4 
represents a concept of the FDNY app icon, dubbed “FDNY Mobile.” Figure 5 depicts a 
concept log-in screen to access the app. Figure 6 is the concept home screen for FDNY 
Mobile with corresponding features. 
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Figure 4.  FDNY Mobile App Icon 
Figure 5.  FDNY Mobile Login Screen 
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Figure 6.  FDNY Mobile Home Screen109 
                                                 
109 FDNY Mobile was designed by researching mobile applications in use by the Sacramento Fire 
Department, the District of Columbia Fire Department, and the Bossier City, Louisiana Fire Department. 
While these agencies have gone mobile, it appears much of their apps are designed for public use and do 
not specifically target department personnel as potential users. The mobile applications are scalable to any 
size organization. The features within the applications are based on the information-sharing requirements of 
the particular agency. 
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(1) GIS 
This feature makes the current FDNY GIS technology mobile. Individual fire 
companies collect a wealth of data while conducting building inspections and responding 
to emergencies. These data include anything affecting the safety of responders as well as 
any suspicious behavior or activity witnessed. A mobile GIS feature will connect the 
experiences of the fire and EMS sides of the FDNY. Currently, these experiences and 
potential life-saving knowledge are not shared between the groups. Within the GIS 
feature, each firehouse and EMS station is pinned on the map to provide members with 
locations of facilities. This is no different than what Google Maps provides in terms of 
layout. The image in Figure 7 shows a map of local firehouses in Brooklyn, New York, 
as it would appear in the app. 
 
Figure 7.  Map of Firehouses and EMS Stations in Brooklyn, New York110 
The department needs its own app with accurate, real-time data. According to 
Google Maps, Engine 247 in Brooklyn is permanently closed, making this inaccuracy 
unreliable. The images in Figure 8 shows an example of Google Maps data. 
                                                 




Figure 8.  Google Maps Data Showing Engine 247 Permanently Closed111 
The GIS feature within FDNY Mobile can also store the specific hazard 
information and SAR activity for each firehouse and EMS battalion. This feature allows 
firefighters and EMS personnel working a shift in a different area of the city to gain 
instant access to specific threats and hazards in that area. Relocated units would also 
benefit from access to this data. Making the GIS feature interactive could allow officers 
in the field to both pull and push information from and to others when necessary. Instead 
of going back to the firehouse or EMS station to write a report, the officer can instantly 
drop a pin on the location where the event took place with particular details to share 
immediately with other members. Such a feature is useful for sharing hazardous 
information that does not require additional vetting by fire marshals or LE.  
                                                 




(2) Response Feed 
By providing the box number, address, type of occupancy, and—most 
importantly—the units responding to a call, members could receive a real-time picture of 
FDNY activity throughout the city. This real-time picture provides members with critical 
information that could impact operations at the next emergency. The FDNY limits much 
of the information it shares via its Twitter and Facebook accounts. As cited in the survey 
analysis in Chapter III, much of the information shared on the department’s social media 
pages is for public safety. Fires and major emergencies are shared, but details include 
only the address, type of occupancy, and the location of the fire. There are several 
unofficial websites and mobile messenger apps FDNY members use to obtain more 
details on department response information. According to the FDNY survey cited in this 
thesis, approximately 63 percent of members receive information from one of these sites.  
(3) Pass It On Program 
The concept of this feature in FDNY Mobile is to build an electronic database for 
the Pass It On Program. Unfortunately, members do not have these valuable shared 
experiences in a digital format. This limits the effectiveness of the program as older 
experiences are often never reviewed. Hard copies of the Pass It On Program notes are 
stored on a clipboard and kept in the common area of the firehouse with the most recent 
experiences stacked on top of older submissions. This type of storage leads to ineffective 
sharing and an uninformed workforce. A Pass It On Program feature in the app could 
allow for the digital storage of all shared experiences, improving dissemination to all 
personnel. A digital format of these experiences also provides officers with the ability to 
search for specific topics to enhance training among members. Digital access to these 
examples could also provide guidance to on-scene incident commanders encountering a 
similar type of event for the first time.  
(4) FDNY Procedures 
Digital access to FDNY procedures allows for the professional development of 
firefighter and EMS personnel. The FDNY has thousands of pages of procedures 
describing mitigation techniques for particular emergencies. Due to evolving threats and 
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changes to department policy, these procedures are changed quite frequently. This feature 
could allow members to access the most up-to-date procedures issued by the department. 
Firefighters study the most commonly used standard operating procedures while in 
probationary firefighter school. EMS rookies study an operations guide while in the EMS 
academy. Fire officers from the rank of lieutenant through staff-level chief must have 
intricate knowledge of these manuals when studying for promotional exams. More 
importantly, these procedures are designed to keep all firefighters and EMS personnel 
safe while operating at an emergency. Having a feature in the app to supply all 
procedures could help ensure responders have all the information necessary for even the 
rarest of emergencies. A search function within this feature could allow members to 
search for specific keywords to find the material they need as opposed to having to look 
through an index or knowing the particular document number.  
(5) Department Orders 
Usually released once every few days, the FDNY department orders include 
comprehensive lists of personnel movements, such as promotions, retirements, and 
FDNY events, going on around the city. Most importantly, this bulletin highlights any 
changes to department procedures made by senior leadership. These changes in policy 
often affect different types of response or inspection activity. 
(6) SARs/Unusual Activity 
As cited previously, the FDNY has yet to adopt the nationwide SAR initiative. 
However, for decades, the department has reported suspicious activity experienced by 
field personnel. This type of field reporting creates an inductive picture of what is going 
on around the city. This feature has the potential to become the new push–pull of 
suspicious activity for the FDNY. The department can pull information from the outer 
edge of the workforce by allowing members to report suspicious activity via FDNY 
Mobile. Once the information is vetted, the department can push it out to the workforce, 
creating horizontal dissemination. Many unusual experiences of fire personnel have 
relevance in the EMS world and vice versa. This feature could create a new intelligence 
product for the FDNY by analyzing events happening on the ground. The FDNY app 
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provides a flow of critical information, thus enhancing the situational awareness of all 
members of the department.  
(7) Watchline  
Pushing Watchline through FDNY Mobile would allow both on- and off-duty 
members better access to the department’s lone intelligence product. Survey and 
DiamondPlate usage data suggest that members in the field are interested in learning 
more about suspicious activity and terrorism-related information.   
(8) Watchline Alert 
When critical information must reach members of the FDNY, the department can 
push it to all personnel through Watchline Alert. This feature would replicate the kind of 
federal alert that went out following the Chelsea bombing incident in 2016. This type of 
notification is also used for amber alerts or emergencies such as chemical spills.112 This 
alert system would provide members in the field with real-time information, improving 
the department’s information-sharing capabilities. Currently, members must wait for the 
weekly release of Watchline for any type of intelligence. The screen capture in Figure 9 is 
an example of the alert system on a mobile device. 
                                                 
112 “Here’s How You Got a Mobile Alert on the Chelsea Bomb Suspect,” New York Post, September 
19, 2016, http://nypost.com/2016/09/19/heres-how-you-got-a-mobile-alert-on-the-chelsea-bomb-suspect/. 
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Figure 9.  Terrorist Threat Notification on Mobile Device113 
B. CONCLUSION 
Using both GIS technology already available on FDNY computers and a new 
FDNY mobile application could provide more efficient and effective opportunities to 
share information with department personnel. Current dissemination practices in the 
FDNY rely on slow processes that are either unreliable or ineffective at reaching every 
member of the department. The FDNY can leverage its GIS unit to share situational 
awareness information affecting day-to-day operations as well as terrorism-related 
information. Developing a mobile app for the FDNY can enhance the safety of members 
by allowing field personnel to access critical information when necessary. Front-line 
members could use an FDNY app to push and pull information to and from all members 
of the department. Using mobile technology to share information could build a linked 
network among all members of the FDNY. Properly disseminating threat and safety 
information through a mobile application could satisfy the intelligence needs of all field 
personnel. 
                                                 
113 Source: “New Yorkers get alarming emergency alert about Chelsea bombing suspect,” PIX 11, 
September 19, 2016, http://pix11.com/2016/09/19/new-yorkers-get-alarming-emergency-alert-about-
chelsea-bombing-suspect/. 
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VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter provides recommendations for how to improve information sharing 
within the FDNY. These recommendations are based on the analysis and findings from 
previous chapters. In addition, this chapter provides guidelines for implementing 
organizational change within the FDNY. These guidelines were synthesized from select 
organizational change theories and analysis of both successful and failed changes by the 
FDNY. 
A. FINDINGS 
Scholars and practitioners have researched and written on the importance of 
information sharing among agencies, beginning with the 9/11 Commission Report. The 
Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) was an information-sharing initiative that 
attempted to enhance communication but struggled to remain relevant and eventually 
dissolved. Similarly to Joshua Dennis’s thesis, the FSIE was focused on organizational 
sharing from the 10,000-foot level. This research took the baton and started a 
conversation on how to better share information within an individual organization. 
Without first building a solid internal communication foundation, any type of 
information-sharing endeavor with other agencies is destined for failure. This thesis 
focused on the FDNY’s communication practices to analyze specific information-sharing 
gaps still existing since the 2002 McKinsey & Company report. Assessing areas in which 
the department can improve internal information sharing was essential for providing 
appropriate solutions. Practitioners have argued that FDNY service members acting as 
gatherers of information could benefit the IC and LE. These FDNY members are 
perfectly postured to collect and report threat and safety information due to their public 
accessibility. Firefighters and EMS personnel randomly discover all types of clandestine 
activity while responding to emergencies. This raw information could provide IC 
members and LE key pieces of intelligence these agencies would otherwise not be able to 
obtain.  
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1. Information Sharing from the Front Line 
Although preventing terrorism appears to have been New York City’s focus in the 
years following 9/11, the FDNY provides its members very little instruction for 
identifying and reporting suspected terrorist activity. The FDNY instructs its firefighters 
and EMS personnel who suspect terrorist activity to not confront individuals and to notify 
the Bureau of Fire Investigation. The department preaches, if you see something, say 
something.114 Although DHS’s “If you see something, say something” campaign seems 
to be working, it is not specific enough for the FDNY. The FDNY is using a campaign 
designed to engage ordinary citizens to participate in the homeland security enterprise. 
Although the campaign has merit, the FDNY may not have the right policy in place to 
facilitate when members need to “say something.” When members encounter suspected 
terrorist activity, current policy only requires notifying FDNY fire marshals. There is no 
procedure in place to share this information with the NYPD or other LE agencies. 
Notifying the NYPD seems a logical step in the communication process when someone 
discovers suspected terrorist activity. Conversely, it is likely NYPD intelligence has 
certain information FDNY fire marshals and members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force 
do not. Information sharing between these organizations must be reciprocal. In contrast to 
the procedure for suspected terrorist activity, the ERP bulletin requires officers to notify 
the battalion chief, deputy chief, hazardous materials unit, the Bureau of Fire 
Investigation, and the NYPD upon discovering clandestine drug laboratories.115 LE is 
notified here to help mitigate the situation. There is no clear indication in FDNY 
procedures why the NYPD is notified for one type of incident, but not another. 
2. Information Sharing for Situational Awareness 
Much of the existing research focuses on inter-agency information sharing, not on 
how one organization shares important information within its own respective agencies. 
Valuable pieces of information affecting the situational awareness of all FDNY members 
have not been disseminated effectively. Information that needs to be shared includes 
                                                 
114 FDNY, “Operations at Explosive or Incendiary Incidents,” in Fire/EMS Tactics and Procedures, 
Addendum 3 (EMS OGP 105-01) (New York: FDNY, 2015), 28. 
115 Ibid., 29. 
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threat and safety information affecting daily operations as well as potential terrorist 
activity. A dearth of these types of information threatens the life and safety of fire and 
EMS personnel. Threat and safety information is oftentimes analyzed in a deductive 
fashion within the FDNY, limiting the type of information front-line members receive. 
By gathering the fragments from front-line members, the department can build a 
composite of what is happening in New York City. Combining these two approaches—
deductive and inductive analysis—provides comprehensive awareness and potential 
intelligence to homeland security partners and the IC. Figure 10 represents the deductive 
threat analysis currently taking place within the FDNY’s CTDP. Deductive analysis uses 
various threats represented by the letter T, from other areas around the world, to assess 
for potential threats to New York City and the FDNY. This information is pushed out to 
front-line members through Watchline. 
 
Figure 10.  Deductive Threat Analysis 
In contrast, Figure 11 represents the inductive threat analysis needed within the 
FDNY in which T equals threat. This model pulls information from front-line members to 
create an awareness of specific threats actually present within the city. This flow of 




Figure 11.  Inductive Threat Analysis 
3. Potential of DiamondPlate 
Improving the push and pull of information to and from the outer edge of the 
workforce could enhance members’ situational awareness. The department has 
recognized the importance of information sharing with its members through the 
implementation of DiamondPlate in 2011. While DiamondPlate has given the department 
a great tool to push information to the workforce, this information system does not allow 
the FDNY to pull of information from the front lines. This limitation inhibits potential 
communication of valuable or even critical information.  
DiamondPlate data provided quantitative analysis to support the need for new 
technological solutions for sharing information. Although DiamondPlate is the only web-
based information-sharing platform in the FDNY, it struggles to reach most fire and EMS 
personnel. Of the 14,000 personnel with access to DiamondPlate, an average of only 252 
viewed a featured item every seven days.116 There are several reasons for this disconnect. 
First, the accessibility of DiamondPlate is extremely limited. Members have no access to 
the information while off duty, and when on duty, units are busier than ever. Thus, there 
are limited opportunities to sit at the DiamondPlate-accessible kiosk and review new 
information. Having one computer kiosk in the firehouse and EMS station also limits 
chances for professional development. EMS personnel experience the worst access to 
DiamondPlate because members spend their entire tours of duty on ambulances, which 
lack DiamondPlate access.  
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Field personnel are concerned they are not receiving potentially life-saving 
information at the front-line level. The results from the internal FDNY survey, as 
discussed in Chapter III, suggest there are information-sharing gaps within the FDNY to 
and from the front line. Approximately 99 percent of FDNY members surveyed believe 
learning about suspicious activity from around the city is relevant to their jobs. 
Approximately 93 percent use apps on their smartphones while 85 percent would like to 
learn about suspicious activity via an app. The nefarious behavior a fire company 
experiences in Brooklyn can affect the situational awareness of other units from different 
boroughs. If the FDNY can leverage FDNY Mobile to share threat and safety information 
with its personnel, the department will enhance the safety of its workforce. A more 
efficient communication practice within the FDNY provides a building block for better 
inter-agency information sharing. 
4. Existing Technology 
The FDNY’s GIS Unit has the capability to share information with all members 
of the department. According to a white paper by software supplier Esri, GIS technology 
can “retrieve large amounts of data maintained by agencies … and allows fire staff to 
access and integrate diverse datasets with existing preplanning, incident, and other fire 
data.”117 The fire service already uses GIS technology to share particular information 
with personnel from all levels of the department. This technology has tremendous 
potential as an information-sharing platform, but access is limited to the lone kiosks in 
each firehouse and EMS station. Cultural practices also inhibit the use of GIS technology 
within the FDNY. Members have never been afforded training on how to use the 
software and have not yet embraced the platform as an information-sharing tool. While 
other departments use GIS technology to its fullest potential, the FDNY is just beginning 
to realize the potential benefits of a technology it already has in place. 
Implementing a new FDNY mobile app could connect fire and EMS personnel for 
the first time in the department’s history. In addition, fire and EMS members could 
                                                 
117 Esri, GIS for the Fire Service (Redlands, CA: Esri, 2012), https://www.esri.com/~/media/Files/ 
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connect with coworkers from other firehouses and EMS stations. According to the DHS 
Science and Technology Directorate, expanding into mobile-friendly applications is a 
great way to reach much the population.118 By leveraging mobile app technology, the 
department could share valuable information that would otherwise go undisclosed. 
Connecting members of the department through a mobile app builds a network that could 
satisfy the intelligence needs of all field personnel.  
5. Learning from Failures 
Synthesizing organizational change theories with the FDNY’s successful and 
failed change attempts is necessary for determining key factors when implementing 
change. However, implementing change within the FDNY is not an easy task. In order 
for the department to adopt a mobile application, senior leadership must support the 
initiative. In addition, it is essential that front-line members provide feedback so their 
operational requirements are met throughout the change process. These requirements set 
forth by the workforce allow for the department to pivot when necessary and offer the 
best possible product to connect all members of the workforce. Common threads found in 
successful changes made by the FDNY included managerial support, a sense of urgency 
for the change to be made, a willingness to separate from the past, and pilot programs for 
the recommended change. Piloting a change is necessary for successful implementation. 
Without a pilot program and feedback from membership, even a successful change can 
collapse and fail. DiamondPlate was successfully implemented, although not piloting the 
program appears to have hindered its reach and effectiveness. Critical factors found in 
failed attempts at implementing change in the FDNY included a lack of managerial 
support, poor implementation planning, a lack of understanding of the organization’s 
intentions, and employees’ attitudes toward the change.  
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6. Leavitt’s Diamond 
Leavitt’s Diamond provides a simple framework to ensure change is successfully 
implemented. Notably, even when following the guidelines set forth by Leavitt—as seen 
in the FDNY SAR program example—without managerial support, the change initiative 
can fail. Leavitt’s Diamond could provide the FDNY with the ability to understand which 
aspects of the department need to be changed and when any change initiative is taking 
place. In the case of implementing a new FDNY mobile app, the department is changing 
the technology variable in Leavitt’s model. In doing so, the department must address the 
necessary changes to the corresponding structures, tasks, and people. According to 
Leavitt, organizations remold themselves not in direct response to great ideas, but for the 
development of new intervening technology.119 Better connecting the FDNY workforce 
and making communication easier comes from the development of a new FDNY mobile 
application.   
7. Going Forward 
Improving communication between members and headquarters could enhance the 
safety of members from both fire and EMS. Sharing FDNY threat and safety information 
in a more effective fashion can benefit other agencies as well. With a clearer picture of 
what is actually going on around the city, the department can leverage this knowledge to 
create a safer working environment and also share this data with LE and the IC. 
Information collected by members of the department could contain sensitive LE data that 
affects ongoing investigations. Providing all members of the department with training on 
how to share this type of information is necessary if the department wants to successfully 
implement the intelligence practices listed in its 2007 strategy.120 Better connecting 
members of the FDNY strengthens the department’s node in the LE and IC networks.  
If an organization the size of the FDNY can use mobile technology to connect all 
members of the department, other organizations can use the same type of technology to 
enhance their information sharing. Mobile applications are used by a variety of public 
                                                 
119 Leavitt, “Applied Organizational Change in Industry,” 1148. 
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safety agencies to communicate with the public. According to Pew Research, over 75 
percent of Americans are using smartphones and a growing number of the population 
uses smartphones as a primary means of online access at home.121 As technology 
advances and its adoption is universally accepted by a younger generation, organizations 
have more effective and efficient options to share information with their workforce.  
8. A Need for Parity 
There is parity between the FDNY and the NYPD, but only to an extent. 
Throughout the city’s history, the FDNY and NYPD have responded to the same types of 
emergencies. According to John Buntin, “The NYPD and the FDNY have more 
overlapping services than most urban police and fire departments.”122 Whether it is a 
disaster like Hurricane Sandy, a terrorist attack like 9/11, or an overturned vehicle with 
people trapped inside, these two great departments respond to save lives whenever they 
are called. Though there is parity between the FDNY and NYPD in certain response 
considerations, when it comes to technological implementation, a gap remains. In 2014, 
the NYPD received 6,000 tablets (one for every squad car) and 41,000 smartphones for 
officers throughout the department.123 These devices help officers with field work by 
providing access to information and databases. The NYPD’s new smartphones are 
equipping officers with an app called the Domain Awareness System, otherwise known 
as DAS Mobile.124 According to Alfred Ng of CNET, “On a single day … 5,500 NYPD 
officers logged in and clicked on 39,000 notifications. They’re not distracted from work, 
though. Those notifications were 911 calls.”125 Figures 12 and 13 depict the new NYPD 
smartphone and login process.  
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Figure 12.  NYPD-Issued Smartphone126 
 
Figure 13.  NYPD Officer Logs into His Phone Using His Police Identification127 
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New York City Mayor Bill DeBlasio recognized the value of this technology in 
the hands of field personnel. The mayor stated, “The new technology is invaluable in the 
war on terror.… Just imagine for a moment information instantaneously going to each 
and every one of our 35,000 officers.”128 Firefighters are starving for this type of access 
to situational awareness information and intelligence. It is time for technological parity 
between these two departments. 
Building an FDNY mobile app takes much of the information disseminated by the 
department and transforms it into a digital sharing environment. The development of such 
a program could answer this author’s research question, which so few have studied—
How can the FDNY better inform its members of threat and safety information? FDNY 
Mobile can provide the department with a tool to effectively push information out to a 
workforce in need of unshared threat and safety information. In addition, the technology 
will allow the department to easily pull this type of information from front-line members. 
Investing in FDNY Mobile builds a solid information-sharing network for the FDNY and 
aids future inter-agency sharing endeavors with the NYPD and other homeland security 
partners. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS ISSUES IDENTIFIED AS 
CHALLENGES 
Without FDNY managerial support, any change attempt likely ends in failure. 
This barrier to change is critical within the FDNY, regardless of the change initiative. 
Several change barriers must be addressed in order to facilitate the department’s use of 
FDNY Mobile. Senior leadership must acknowledge the current information-sharing gaps 
within the department as well as the intelligence needs of FDNY personnel. There is a 
sense of urgency when learning of the information-sharing gaps and how many members 
of the department remain uninformed. These feelings could allow senior leaders to 
separate from past communication practices and support a new technology for improving 
the dissemination of threat and safety information.  
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To implement an FDNY mobile app, the organizational change barriers 
highlighted in this thesis need attention. Critical factors impacting the adoption of this 
new mobile technology were derived from synthesizing organizational change theories 
discussed in Chapter IV along with FDNY change examples. Resistance to change in the 
FDNY has included personal and organizational factors as well as factors that are specific 
to the change itself. Addressing change barriers and creating new policies can help build 
a new information-sharing framework for the FDNY. This section outlines eight 
recommendations for implementing FDNY Mobile. 
(1) Employees’ Attitudes/Disposition toward the Change 
As seen in the 2007 FDNY strategy, firefighters and EMS personnel must believe 
in the mission at hand. If the change is too invasive, it has the potential to sour the 
attitudes of the workforce, resulting in a potential failure. Based on the survey data, 
members have expressed a need for better information sharing and a willingness to use 
mobile technology. The results from the survey suggest the workforce would accept this 
new information-sharing technology. 
Recommendation #1: Adopt a new FDNY information-sharing strategy. 
(2) Lack of Understanding of the Organization’s Intentions 
The 2007 FDNY strategy suggested FDNY personnel should augment their roles 
by becoming “first preventers,” first responders who are able to recognize threats to 
homeland security, report the suspicious activity, and preserve the scene for law 
enforcement.129 Members understand their access and response provides an opportunity 
for potential intelligence collection. What they do not understand is how to go about 
collecting this data and how to appropriately share it with the workforce. While members 
of the department are given an eight-hour training class to better recognize such activity, 
it is not enough to impact their situational awareness and improve information sharing. 
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Recommendation #2: In order for the workforce to buy into FDNY 
Mobile, the department must express the need for the application as well 
as explain how members should use such a technology. Adding a segment 
to the curriculum of the eight-hour terrorism awareness class provides 
necessary training so all members understand the purpose of the app and 
department procedures surrounding its use. 
(3) Disruption of Routine 
Firefighters and EMS personnel are creatures of habit. The foundation of their job 
function requires them to work in a regimented fashion, but adapt to unpredictable 
emergencies as well. When responding to incidents around the city, these professionals 
rely on standard operating procedures to mitigate a variety of emergencies. However, 
oftentimes these responders must adapt or deviate from routine practices to get the job 
done. FDNY Mobile will disrupt the routines of the FDNY workforce. Nevertheless, if 
the technology is not disruptive, its benefits will not be as impactful.   
Recommendation #3: Connecting all members of the FDNY to each other 
and with headquarters through a mobile application will provide members 
an alternative to past inefficient communications. Department-wide 
acceptance of FDNY Mobile is possible because responders have shown 
their ability to adapt when necessary. According to Leavitt, human 
acceptance is the real carrier of any change initiative.130  
(4) Lack of Rewards for Implementing Change 
The FDNY is an organization built around merit. This meritocracy begins with 
the FDNY entrance exam and continues through promotional exams. The department 
awards points on future promotional exams to members who successfully revive a patient 
found in cardiac arrest or go above and beyond the call of duty during a fire.  
Recommendation #4: This same type of recognition is needed when 
members discover potential terrorist activity and appropriately report it. If 
the dissemination of this potential intelligence leads to successful law-
enforcement apprehension, it only makes sense that the unit uncovering 
the threat receives recognition.  
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(5) Organizational Size and Rigidity 
Even though the FDNY is one of the largest fire departments in the country, it has 
proven itself capable of making department-wide changes when necessary. Implementing 
a new technology to improve information sharing is familiar territory for the department.  
Recommendation #5: Members working on initiating FDNY Mobile 
could use the DiamondPlate endeavor as a successful model. The project 
charter for DiamondPlate required delivering a broad range of information 
and knowledge to members in the field in a quick and efficient manner.131 
Front-line members chosen by bureau heads worked with technical 
support staff to produce content based on their subject-matter expertise. 
Those who developed DiamondPlate had to familiarize themselves with 
new technology in the form of Adobe Creation. Multiple groups consisting 
of both uniformed and non-uniformed personnel worked seamlessly to get 
DiamondPlate up and running. These groups included FDNY Operations, 
the Bureau of Technology Development and Systems, the Bureau of 
Training, and the CTDP, among many others.132 Although this thesis has 
questioned the reach of the DiamondPlate platform as an information-
sharing tool, it certainly recognizes the platform’s successful navigation 
through many organizational change barriers.  
(6) Lack of Management Support for the Change 
According to Mosca and Rosenberg, “There cannot be any resistance on the part 
of management in order for an organizational change to be successfully implemented.”133 
Every successful FDNY change studied in this research had the support of senior 
leadership. While this support does not guarantee success, it certainly increases the 
probability of successful implementation. Senior leaders have supported the idea of 
increasing the prevention and deterrence capabilities of their personnel, but front-line 
members have received neither sufficient training nor the appropriate tools to adequately 
share and receive gathered information.  
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Recommendation #6: Create a sense of urgency by presenting this 
research to senior-level leadership. Inform these key FDNY leaders of the 
first responders’ need for FDNY Mobile, and how similar mobile 
technology is already used to connect with the public.   
(7) Poor Implementation Planning 
When electing to build FDNY Mobile for its workforce, the department must pay 
particular attention to how the technology is implemented. According to Mosca and 
Rosenberg, “If organizations can take the right steps to strengthen the execution of their 
change strategies, then the odds of success for change will likely improve.”134 Working 
with members in the field is essential to ensuring the most important information is 
shared via the app. Many successful FDNY changes in the past incorporated a piloting 
program. Even though the idea is to get this type of technology in the hands of as many 
FDNY firefighters and EMS personnel as possible, the department should not unveil the 
app for the entire organization right away. As seen with DiamondPlate, an innovation can 
provide excellent content, but if the FDNY does not implement FDNY Mobile in the 
right way, intended results could suffer.  
Recommendation #7: The department has a significant amount of 
information it needs to share to improve situational awareness and uncover 
potential terrorism. The FDNY must handle collected information with a 
potential nexus to terrorism in a different manner than current policy 
prescribes. Sharing this type of information with the NYPD in addition to 
the Bureau of Fire Investigation should fill a portion of the inter-agency 
information-sharing gap still existing between the two departments.  
(8) Leavitt’s Diamond for FDNY Mobile 
According to Leavitt’s construct, incorporating new technology into the FDNY 
will affect the structure, task, and people variables at work. Failing to modify all 
variables at the same time negatively impacts implementation. Figure 14 superimposes 
FDNY Mobile as a technology, as well as the FDNY’s affected structure, task, and 
people variables, onto Leavitt’s Diamond. 
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Figure 14.  FDNY Mobile in Leavitt’s Diamond 
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Recommendation #8: When implementing FDNY Mobile, the 
department needs to change the following variables: 
a) Task. According to Leavitt, “One improves performance of tasks by 
clarifying and defining the jobs of people and setting up clearly 
defined relationships among those jobs, with authority, responsibility, 
and coordination mechanisms spelled out.”135 Members need training 
for how to appropriately use FDNY Mobile. Members are sharing 
information now, just not in the most efficient way. In lieu of using a 
fax machine, an officer would use the mobile app to communicate 
threat and safety information to other members of the department.  
b) Structure. As Leavitt’s model predicts, the system of communication 
and workflow within the FDNY will change due to this new 
technology. Members will now have the ability to share and receive 
information while away from the firehouse or EMS station. This 
applies to both on-duty and off-duty members. While this change 
improves information sharing for firefighters, it will drastically 
improve access to information for EMS personnel as there is no 
intranet access provided on ambulances. Because the FDNY is 
dependent on its procedures to define the tasks of its workforce, the 
department will need to create new policies that codify how to share 
information using FDNY Mobile.  
c) People. Implementing a department-wide change through a new 
communication tool requires staff to support such an initiative. This 
change should involve members of the FDNY Information and 
Technology Department along with front-line fire and EMS members. 
This mix of civilian and field personnel worked well together during 
DiamondPlate’s development. Changing the technology the 
department uses to share information presents an opportunity to invite 
the NYPD to access FDNY Mobile. This mobile application has the 
potential to improve the flow of threat and safety information as well 
as actionable intelligence between these two departments. 
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C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
This thesis placed the FDNY under a microscope to highlight internal 
information-sharing gaps that still exist within the organization. Initial research was 
dedicated to finding solutions to the continued inter-agency communication problems 
between the FDNY and NYPD. This author believes many scholars have focused their 
research on inter-agency communication because the federal government has placed 
significant emphasis on this goal. These efforts have put the cart before the horse. This is 
not to say their research was wasted. In fact, it was necessary to bring this author to the 
conclusion that very little research has focused on information-sharing practices of 
individual organizations. If the federal government places more emphasis on improving 
information-sharing practices at the individual organizational level, change initiatives 
involving inter-agency information sharing should have a better shot at successful 
implementation. We have learned over the years that if the FDNY and other agencies 
continue to silo potential life-saving information, the next Chief Fahy tragedy looms 
unnecessarily in the first responders’ future. 
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